Cyber Capabilities

Abstract

This chapter investigates the development of industrial and technological capabilities for cyber defence in Europe up to 2016. It assesses (a) the relevant policies, as well as (b) the institutional and (c) the industrial and technologies resources of Western Europe’s major powers (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), and then of a selection of representative examples of medium and lesser powers (Italy, Spain, and Sweden).’ It establishes that since the mid-2000s developing cyber-security and cyber-defence capabilities emerged as a top priority for all the European powers examined. The most important efforts were from Europe’s largest military powers, France and the UK, which both showcase a firm intention to belong to the circle of leading powers in cyberspace. The efficacy of these efforts is hard to judge, given the absence of greater transparency and the nature of the cyber risks and threats.

Towards AUKUS Collaboration on Responsible Military Artificial Intelligence: Co-Design and Co-Development of AI Among the United States, the UK and Australia

“…87 Of direct relevance to military AI and autonomous systems, DoD Directive 3000.09 imposes a requirement to exercise 'appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement', 88 and that such systems 'must be reviewed and approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, and the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before they are formally developed, and again before they are fielded'. 89 Within this policy framework, each service branch adopts its own approach to conducting legal reviews. In the case of the U.S. Army, a single lawyer is assigned to undertake the review, although they have broad authority to request support or information.…”

Military review in the context of cyber-warfare. Article 36 of 1977 additional protocol i in practice

“…At the same time, none of them imposed an obligation to review weapons. The control of legality in the perspective of the customary norm could originate in the Martens Clause, which would permit the use of weapons under the principle of humanity and the requirements of human conscience 18 .…”

“…Consideration should focus on the potential consequences of a cyber-attack . Those responsible for conducting the review should weigh, whether a possible cyber-attack could cause harm to civilians (damage visible in the physical world such as the loss of health or death), but also, whether it could lead to the physical loss or destruction of data (by which all and any data necessary for the proper functioning of civilian facilities that facilitate the protection of civilians are meant) 27 . Given the growing interest in environmental protection, including in the context of an armed conflict, military review should verify that a cyber-attack would not cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment 28 .…”

Finding a Path Through The Autonomous Weapon Systems Stalemate

“…While some have argued it may be possible 142 , others argue that translating the requirements of proportionality into an algorithmic form is a significant challenge, and may never be possible. 143 Adding to this complexity, is that the AWS will also need to show its compliance with this core principle during the weapon's review.…”

“…335 The targets of AWS could be restricted, such that AWS could only be used to attack non-human targets. 336 Alternatively, for human targets, there could be a requirement that AWS only be equipped with non-lethal capabilities (such as pepper sprays, optical dazzlers or active denial systems). 337 There could also be requirements on the quantity of AWS being used, to ensure no command or control is lost (this links to corresponding capacities for human in-the-loop operation of those weapons).…”