Customers’ strategic behavior in batch arrivals M 2 / M /1 queue

Ziani, Sofiane; Rahmoune, Fazia; Radjef, Mohammed Saïd

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2015.06.040

Cited by 14 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Most of the works can be integrated into the class of non-cooperative games in strategic form, even if the game models are not always formulated in explicit form. However, in recent years, a number of studies has been carried out to model the strategic interactions of decision makers in queueing systems, which use dynamic game tools (see [5,6,14,19,27,34,35],...).…”

Section: The Social Welfarementioning

confidence: 99%

The service pricing strategies and the strategic behavior of customers in an unobservable Markovian queue with unreliable server

2022

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A Stackelberg game is used to study the service pricing and the strategic behavior of customers in an unreliable and totally unobservable M/M/1 queue under a reward-cost structure. At the first stage, the server manager, acting as a leader, chooses a service price and, at the second stage, a customer, arriving at the system and acting as a follower, chooses to join the system or an outside opportunity, knowing only the service price imposed by the server manager and the system parameters. We show that the constructed game admits an equilibrium and we give explicit forms of server manager and customers equilibrium behavioral strategies. The results of the proposed model show that the assumption that customers are risk-neutral is fundamental for the standard approach usually used. Moreover, we determine the socially optimal price that maximizes the social welfare and we compare it to the Stackelberg equilibrium. We illustrate, by numerical examples, the effect of some system parameters on the equilibrium service price and the revenue of the server manager.

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Section: The Social Welfarementioning

confidence: 99%

The service pricing strategies and the strategic behavior of customers in an unobservable Markovian queue with unreliable server

2022

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“…For example, both Su and Zhang (2008) and studied supply chain coordination based on customer behavior strategy. In addition, Yang et al (2015), Ziani et al (2015) studied the profits of supply chain members in different modes with strategic customers. In summary, the research on customer strategic behavior mainly focuses on its negative impact on supply chain profits and…”

Section: Conspicuous Customers and Strategic Customer Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing decision with conspicuous customers: quick responses versus value-added services

Liu

Wei

Wang

et al. 2020

International Journal of Production Research

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In order to eliminate the negative effects of customer strategic behavior, retailers often adopt quick response or value-added services. While in a luxury market with conspicuous customers, retailers' pricing decisions of these two strategies become more complicated. This paper studies a supply chain with a retailer serving a mixture of conspicuous and ordinary strategic customers. We develop three models so that the retailer provides i) neither quick response nor value-added services;ii) only quick response; iii) only value-added services. Subsequently, we analyze the impacts of conspicuous customers on quick response and value-added services by pricing and strategy comparisons. The model further extends to the situation including both strategies. The results show that, firstly, when the proportion is less than a threshold, the retailer should adopt a low price strategy, and vice versa. Besides, the quick response could induce the retailer to adopt high price while value-added services inhibit it. Secondly, the customer conspicuous behavior can motivate retailers to provide quick response and inhibit their value-added services. Finally, by observing the retailer's decisions when they can adopt two strategies simultaneously, we find that the existence of quick response can amplify the benefits of value-added services.

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“…The article's findings do not completely echo Whitt (1999) because the two papers employ different customer‐choice mechanisms. Ziani, Rahmoune, and Radjef (2015) perform a similar comparison when service requests arrive in batches. More recently, Simhon, Hayel, Starobinski, and Zhu (2016) and Kim and Kim (2017) study the information disclosure decisions of a firm operating a single‐server system.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managing Service Systems via Disguised Queues: The Role of Retaliating Customers*

Çil

2020

Decision Sciences

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Tourist attractions, such as observatory decks, boat tours, and museums, have recently started to manage their operations via hiding some parts of their waiting lines, which we will refer to as queue disguising behavior. If customers are not aware of these disguised parts of the queues, firms can potentially boost their revenues by using queue disguising strategy. However, it is not obvious that firms benefit from disguised queues when customers retaliate after experiencing that the queue management tactics led them to make erroneous decisions. Our goal in this article is to investigate the impacts of the retaliatory customer behavior on firms' queue disguising decisions and profits. In the absence of retaliating customers, we find that the optimal queue disguising strategy yields only negligible profit improvements, relative to letting customers observe the entire waiting line. One, then, may expect that the queue disguising should not be a profitable strategy in a system with retaliating customers. We establish that this intuition is only true for firms incurring negligible holding costs. If keeping customers in the queue is sufficiently high for a firm, we, surprisingly, find that the firm achieves sizable profit improvements via queue disguising in the presence of the retaliatory behavior. More interestingly, we show that these benefits become more pronounced as the holding cost increases, in contrast to the case without retaliating customers. Our results, then, suggest that firms that are subjected to nonnegligible holding costs should employ the queue disguising strategy only while facing retaliating customers.

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Customers’ strategic behavior in batch arrivals M 2 / M /1 queue

Cited by 14 publications

References 18 publications

The service pricing strategies and the strategic behavior of customers in an unobservable Markovian queue with unreliable server

The service pricing strategies and the strategic behavior of customers in an unobservable Markovian queue with unreliable server

Pricing decision with conspicuous customers: quick responses versus value-added services

Managing Service Systems via Disguised Queues: The Role of Retaliating Customers*

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