Curry, dialectic and the modal ontological argument

Abstract

A course of dialogical reasoning involving the atheist and the theist reveals a connection between the Curry phenomenon and the step‐wise construction of a sound version of the modal ontological argument. The exercise is both adversarial and cooperative as the participants are committed to the norms of shared truth‐seeking, respect for one's opponents and a desire to continue the dialectic for as long as possible. The theist relies on the interaction between the properties of a Curry‐style sentence and the structure of implication in order to show that the atheist's own commitments imply Anselm's principle (God necessarily exists if He actually exists at all). As Anselm's principle and the possibility premise are the only assumptions required for the modal ontological argument it follows that the theist has, given the norms of the dialogue, a winning strategy against the atheist. This follows since the possibility premise is granted by the atheist as part of their commitment to the norms governing the dialectic though the theist in virtue of those same norms must accept that God is at best maximally perfect in the light of the argument from evil and the Stone paradox.