Cultures of belief

Abstract

In popular thought about the meaning of religion, as well as established debates in anthropology, religious belief is interpreted as either a commitment to a clear set of propositions, or as a non-literal, symbolic, ethical or social commitment. Anthropologists have tended to support the latter of these positions, so much so that this can now be seen as the ‘anthropological’ position; it is also characteristic of the view of scholars in related disciplines, such as religious studies. This article argues for a third possibility: that religious (and other) believers are often engaged in complex, reflexive practices that stipulate specific cognitive and non-cognitive relationships to propositional content. This is demonstrated with reference to contemporary Buddhism in Inner Mongolia, China. The author argues that the existence of such cultures of belief demonstrates there is a need for a systematic anthropological theory of belief and suggests some sources that may contribute to its formulation

Believing Selves and Cognitive Dissonance: Connecting Individual and Society via “Belief”

“…Appealing to a particular system of meaning, or an emotional experience, does not necessarily entail that one holds a corresponding belief. Moreover, the degrees of belief and varying levels of commitment include the possibility of discrepant, situational, and inconsistent beliefs [3,7,[18][19][20] that can be contradictory, seemingly "syncretic," and vague [21]. The field of anthropology has well-documented the observation that "religious behavior and language are not explained by systems of well thought out belief" ( [21], p. 451).…”

“…Moreover, the degrees of belief and varying levels of commitment include the possibility of discrepant, situational, and inconsistent beliefs [3,7,[18][19][20] that can be contradictory, seemingly "syncretic," and vague [21]. The field of anthropology has well-documented the observation that "religious behavior and language are not explained by systems of well thought out belief" ( [21], p. 451). For example, David Hicks notes that, in the 1960s, "none of his Timorese informants-not even professed members of the [Catholic] Church-expressed any doubts" regarding the "existence" of ancestral spirits.…”

“…Jonathan Mair has explicitly advocated that the study of belief should engage in a comparative approach of different, historically specific modes, and styles or "cultures of belief." In his discussion of Inner Mongolian Buddhists, he argues that rather than the particular content of belief the emphasis is placed on style which is associated with a set of attitudes, modes of experience, practice, and the relationships that stipulate cognitive and non-cognitive associations to propositional content ( [21], p. 450).…”

Suspending Belief: Epoché in Animal Behavior Science

“…I will argue that suspending belief about animal minds is akin to a form of “virtuous action,” a particular technique of the scientific self. The second, related source is a recent call for a new kind of anthropology of belief (Mair in press). Mair argues that anthropologists of religion have too readily given up on the category of belief in the wake of often‐justified critiques.…”

“…Mair argues that anthropologists of religion have too readily given up on the category of belief in the wake of often‐justified critiques. Mair nevertheless points out that the people with whom anthropologists work are themselves often explicitly and actively engaged in “understanding, monitoring, debating and cultivating particular forms of belief” (Mair in press). Mair proposes, quite rightly, that we should study these processes ethnographically and attend to people's own cultivation of particular orientations toward their own beliefs.…”