Cultural specificity versus institutional universalism: a critique of the National Integrity System (NIS) methodology

Heywood, Paul; Johnson, Elizabeth

doi:10.1007/s10611-017-9709-z

Cited by 8 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…This is corroborated by the adoption of laws and the creation of anti-corruption and monitoring organizations. The NIS is rooted in these values, contrary to Heywood and Johnson's (2017) criticism that cultural factors are not considered. Second, corruption affects all sectors of a nation.…”

Section: A Sai-centered Governance Framework To Reduce Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 88%

Public auditing: What impact does the quality of the institutional framework have on the level of corruption?

Tadida

2023

International Review of Administrative Sciences

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Supreme audit institutions (SAIs) are a component of a nation's institutional system. This article defines the concept of an institutional anti-corruption system centered on the SAI through four main characteristics: independence, accountability, mandate and collaboration. The article aims to assess the impact that the quality of the anti-corruption system has on perceived levels of corruption. Data from the 2019 International Budget Partnership Open Budget Survey covering 117 countries are used for this purpose. The regression results show that the quality of the institutional anti-corruption system centered on the SAI is associated with a low level of perceived corruption. However, other elements must be implemented to create an anti-corruption environment, such as citizens’ involvement as controlling actors. Points for practitioners It is important that policy makers recognize and leverage the potential of SAIs in reducing corruption. Contemporary governance and the complexity of corruption require the protection of SAI's independence, but also call for the establishment of collaborative mechanisms that engage civil society and the media.

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Section: A Sai-centered Governance Framework To Reduce Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 88%

Public auditing: What impact does the quality of the institutional framework have on the level of corruption?

Tadida

2023

International Review of Administrative Sciences

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“…For example, while the World Bank definition (corruption as 'the abuse of public office for private gain') assumes the meaning of corruption is fixed, certain and universally applicable across all cultural contexts, some dispute that corruption has an inherent meaning, independent of social relations and interactions (Heywood and Johnson 2017;Bratu and Kazoka 2018). They argue it is instead, constructed, and a product of a particular time and place.…”

Section: Corruption and Its Relationship To Democracymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Anti-corruption measures may also harm developmental goals (Uberti 2016b) and measurement of corruption using international indices can have perverse effects such as contradicting anti-corruption efforts or focusing attention on compliance rather than substantive change (Andersson and Heywood 2009;Heywood and Johnson 2017). The relationship between economic development, corruption and democracy is thus far from straightforward.…”

Section: Corruption and Its Relationship To Democracymentioning

confidence: 99%

“Democracy is the Cure?”: Evolving Constructions of Corruption in Indonesia 1994–2014

Pertiwi

Ainsworth

2020

J Bus Ethics

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Corruption is of central interest to business ethics but its meaning is often assumed to be self-evident and universal. In this paper we seek to re-politicize and unsettle the dominant meaning of corruption by showing how it is culturally specific, relationally derived and varies over time. In particular, we show how corruption's meaning changes depending on its relationship with Western-style liberal democracy and non-Western local experience with its implementation. We chose this focus because promoting democracy is a central plank of the international anti-corruption and development agenda and yet the relationship between corruption and democracy is rarely specified. Adopting a critical-discursive approach that draws on poststructuralism and postcolonialism, we explore how the meaning of corruption constructed The Jakarta Post (TJP) changed in relation to Indonesia's experience in implementing democratic reform, a condition of the international financial aid it received following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. In the 1990s, corruption was seen as an illness, and democracy the cure; from 2000-2011 experience with democracy brought disillusiondemocracy had not cured corruption but caused it to spread; while from 2012-2014 democracy was constructed as a valued end in its own right, but needed protection from corruption in order to survive. From translating the international development agenda in a relatively straightforward way, TJP moved towards constructions of increasing complexity and ambivalence. This demonstrates how corruption's meaning is fundamentally contingent and unstableeven dominant meanings have the potential to be contested, showing how they are an effect of power and raising the possibility of alternatives.Here James Wolfensohn uses a disease metaphor to assert that corruption is universally dysfunctional and should be eradicated because of its costs and consequences. This view, and the World Bank's (1997) more precise definition of it as 'abuse of public office for private gain' has been extremely influential,

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“…The NIS approach has been criticized by scholars and practitioners. Heywood and Johnson (2017) identified several problems: (1) the institutional approach underpinning the NIS methodology is too narrow; (2) the NIS does not focus on cultural distinctiveness; (3) it has an incorrect conceptualization and articulation of "integrity," and (4) it has an overemphasis on compliancebased approaches to combating corruption at the expense of the positive promotion of integrity. They argued that a more effective NIS needed greater recognition of specific cultural challenges and national legacies with effective reforms.…”

Section: National Integrity Systems As Horizontal Accountability Modementioning

confidence: 99%

Horizontal Accountability to Prevent Corruption

Sakib

2020

Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance

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Horizontal accountability contrast with traditional vertical accountability system where the accountee is not hierarchically superior to the accounter (Schillemans 2011). It may alternatively be understood as a form of accountability to third parties. For semiautonomous agencies, independent evaluators, boards of stakeholders or commissioners, journalists, interest groups, and clients can all act as horizontal accountees. In other words, remain accountable to similar status authority. The word "outwards" is key to understand the notion because it infers the accountability of two or more separate, independent authority, where both is under surveillance by each authority (Mulgan 2003). For example, the performance of the election commission accountability can be monitored by judiciary or parliament. From Vertical to Horizontal Accountability Accountability often regarded as "buzzword of the modern era" because of unclear meaning and diversity of the terminology (Mulgan 2003). In simplest term, accountability is a method of keeping citizens informed and authority in check doing misconduct (Aldons 2001). In political science words like transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency, responsiveness, responsibility, integrity, and so on are simultaneously used as synonyms to accountability (Schillemans 2011). There are two ways accountability works: vertical and horizontal accountability (Fig. 1). Vertical accountability denotes a more traditional form of meaning where someone at upper position demands accountability to his subordinates. It is a kind of principal-agent relationship where the principal always asks for the answer to his agents. For example, in a democratic system people (principle) elect a political party (agent) to govern for a period. If they are not satisfied with the government, they withdraw them from power either by the ballot box or demanding resignation or punishment (Head et al. 2016). However, these conventional vertical mechanisms have been criticized by many for limited success holding officials less accountable. The problem is lying within

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Cultural specificity versus institutional universalism: a critique of the National Integrity System (NIS) methodology

Cited by 8 publications

References 20 publications

Public auditing: What impact does the quality of the institutional framework have on the level of corruption?

Public auditing: What impact does the quality of the institutional framework have on the level of corruption?

“Democracy is the Cure?”: Evolving Constructions of Corruption in Indonesia 1994–2014

Horizontal Accountability to Prevent Corruption

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