Cueing Implicit Commitment

Bonalumi, Francesca; Isella, Margherita; Michael, John

doi:10.1007/s13164-018-0425-0

Cited by 14 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…In sum, our results suggest that audiences take speakers to be committed to 'what is meant' rather than 'what is said' (see below for comments on the generality of this finding). More broadly our findings align with theories of commitment based on social expectations (e.g., MacCormick & Raz, 1972;Scanlon, 1998;Sugden, 2000; for experimental support see also Bonalumi, Isella, & Michael, 2019), and they speak against theories which argue that commitments derive from conventions and social practices (e.g., Austin, 1962;Rawls, 1971;Searle, 1969).…”

supporting

confidence: 85%

Commitment and communication: Are we committed to what we mean, or what we say?

Bonalumi¹,

Scott‐Phillips²,

Tacha

et al. 2020

Lang. cogn.

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Are communicators perceived as committed to what they actually say (what is explicit), or to what they mean (including what is implicit)? Some research claims that explicit communication leads to a higher attribution of commitment and more accountability than implicit communication. Here we present theoretical arguments and experimental data to the contrary. We present three studies exploring whether the saying–meaning distinction affects commitment attribution in promises, and, crucially, whether commitment attribution is further modulated by the degree to which the hearer will actually rely on the promise. Our results support the conclusion that people perceive communicators to be committed to ‘what is meant’, and not simply to ‘what is said’. Our findings add to the experimental literature showing that the saying–meaning distinction is not as pivotal to social relations as often assumed, and that its role in commitment attribution might be overestimated. The attribution of commitment is strongly dependent on the (mutually known) relevance of ‘what is meant’.

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supporting

confidence: 85%

Commitment and communication: Are we committed to what we mean, or what we say?

Bonalumi¹,

Scott‐Phillips²,

Tacha

et al. 2020

Lang. cogn.

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Subsequent empirical work has supported Michael et al's [52] framework. Bonalumi et al [53] presented scenarios to participants describing existing implicit commitments ( participants take the perspective of a protagonists) and probing their reactions to violations of those commitments. Normative opprobrium and negative emotional reactions were stronger when the protagonist on the receiving end of the violation was described as having invested more effort to maintain their part of the commitment, or when the joint action had been repeated more often.…”

Section: Problems With Philosophical Accounts Of Joint Commitmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Previous research is silent on the process by which joint commitments are achieved. Processes are usually illustrated by the trite armchair examples described in §2, or participants in the studies by Bonalumi et al [53] are asked to make sense imaginary interactions (e.g. text messages to arrange meetings).…”

Section: Joint Commitment As Process: How the Sense Of Commitment Is ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Every product needs a process: unpacking joint commitment as a process across species

Bangerter

Genty

Heesen

et al. 2022

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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Joint commitment, the feeling of mutual obligation binding participants in a joint action, is typically conceptualized as arising by the expression and acceptance of a promise. This account limits the possibilities of investigating fledgling forms of joint commitment in actors linguistically less well-endowed than adult humans. The feeling of mutual obligation is one aspect of joint commitment (the product ), which emerges from a process of signal exchange. It is gradual rather than binary; feelings of mutual obligation can vary in strength according to how explicit commitments are perceived to be. Joint commitment processes are more complex than simple promising, in at least three ways. They are affected by prior joint actions, which create precedents and conventions that can be embodied in material arrangements of institutions. Joint commitment processes also arise as solutions to generic coordination problems related to opening up, maintaining and closing down joint actions. Finally, during joint actions, additional, specific commitments are made piecemeal. These stack up over time and persist, making it difficult for participants to disengage from joint actions. These complexifications open up new perspectives for assessing joint commitment across species. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Revisiting the human ‘interaction engine’: comparative approaches to social action coordination’.

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“…If speakers can signal different degrees to which they are willing to take responsibility for the truth of their messages, and listeners can track these signals, this might support the stabilization of communication. By signaling the extent to which they are ready to bear either direct or reputational consequences in case they are found to be wrong, speakers might allow listeners to gauge how much to rely on the truth of the claim in question (Bonalumi, Isella, & Michael, 2019). In essence, the strength of a speaker's commitment might be viewed as a signal for how much she is willing to "bet" on the truth of her assertion.…”

Section: Speaker Commitment Can Stabilize Human Communicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effect of source claims on statement believability and speaker accountability

Mahr

Csibra

2021

Mem Cogn

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What is the effect of source claims (such as "I saw it" or "Somebody told me") on the believability of statements and what mechanisms are responsible for this effect? In this study, we tested the idea that source claims impact statement believability by modulating the extent to which a speaker is perceived to be committed to (and thereby accountable for) the truth of her assertion. Across three experiments we presented participants with statements associated with different source claims, asked them to judge how much they believed the statements, and how much the speaker was responsible if the statement turned out to be false. We found that (1) speaker accountability predicted statement believability independently of a statement's perceived prior likelihood or associated source claim; (2) being associated with a claim to first-hand ("I saw that…") or second-hand ("Somebody told me that…") evidence strengthened this association; (3) bare assertions about specific circumstances were commonly interpreted as claims to first-hand evidence; and (4) (everything else being equal) claims to first-hand evidence increased while claims to second-hand evidence decreased both statement believability and speaker accountability. These results support the idea that the believability of a statement is closely related to how committed to its truth the speaker is perceived to be and that source claims modulate the extent of this perceived commitment.

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Cueing Implicit Commitment

Abstract: Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information. If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain details on accessing it.

Cited by 14 publications

References 16 publications

Commitment and communication: Are we committed to what we mean, or what we say?

Commitment and communication: Are we committed to what we mean, or what we say?

Every product needs a process: unpacking joint commitment as a process across species

The effect of source claims on statement believability and speaker accountability

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