Cue integration and the perception of action in intentional binding

Wolpe, Noham; Haggard, Patrick; Siebner, Hartwig R.; Rowe, James B.

doi:10.1007/s00221-013-3419-2

Cited by 122 publications

(169 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Indeed, inhibition of this area leads to a ‘weakening’ of IB, which may be interpreted as a decreased sense of control or agency. Moreover, our data support the view of distinct mechanisms underlying action and effect binding (Wolpe et al ., ). Perturbation of pre‐SMA indeed alters only action binding, maintaining unchanged the effect binding: this peculiarity seems to keep participants more focused on their voluntary actions, ignoring however the produced sensory effect.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Being more focused on the voluntary action itself, without considering the produced effects, suggests that SoA might be decreased. The present data could also be discussed in light of the theories underlying the IB process, which demonstrated that action binding, unlike effect binding, is supported by a ‘cue integration theory’ (Wolpe et al ., ). In detail, estimation of time of action depends on an integration of two separate cues: the action and the sensory effect.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…In detail, sham stimulation significantly differed from anodal and cathodal stimulations, which both tended to reduce IB producing an inhibitory effect. Perceptual shifts were also analysed separately (action binding vs. effect binding) as they seemed to be mediated by different underlying mechanisms (Wolpe et al, 2013). Only action binding (i.e., the shift of the action towards its auditory effect) was significantly reduced.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Neural underpinnings of the ‘agent brain’: new evidence from transcranial direct current stimulation

Cavazzana

Penolazzi

Begliomini

et al. 2015

Eur J of Neuroscience

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Intentional binding (IB) refers to the temporal compression between a voluntary action and its sensory effect, and it is considered an implicit measure of sense of agency (SoA), that is, the capacity to control one's own actions. IB has been thoroughly studied from a behavioural point of view but only few studies have investigated its neural underpinnings, always using the same two paradigms. Although providing evidence that the supplementary motor complex is involved, findings are still too scarce to draw definitive conclusions. The aim of the present study was to establish a causal relationship between the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), known for its key role in action planning and initiation, and IB by means of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). Participants underwent anodal, cathodal and sham control stimulations during three separate sessions (Experiment I). Subsequently, they underwent the same stimulation protocol (Experiment II) using as control a region potentially involved in the processing of the sensory effects of voluntary action (i.e., the right primary auditory cortex for the auditory effects of action). A significant reduction in IB was found only after stimulation of the pre-SMA, which supports the causal contribution of this prefrontal area in the perceived linkage between action and its effects. As SoA could be disrupted in many psychiatric and neurological diseases, these results have direct clinical relevance as tDCS could be successfully used in this domain in virtue of the promising advantages it offers for rehabilitation.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Neural underpinnings of the ‘agent brain’: new evidence from transcranial direct current stimulation

Cavazzana

Penolazzi

Begliomini

et al. 2015

Eur J of Neuroscience

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“…We could not measure saliency of events directly in our design, but salient events are known to capture temporal event perception (Wolpe et al, 2013). Importantly, the intentional binding measure that we used as a proxy for sense of agency was entirely independent of the action selection task, and we gave no feedback regarding timing judgments.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Transmission of Experience of Agency: An Experimental Study

et al. 2016

Self Cite

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The sense of controlling one’s own actions is fundamental to normal human mental function, and also underlies concepts of social responsibility for action. However, it remains unclear how the wider social context of human action influences sense of agency. Using a simple experimental design, we investigated, for the first time, how observing the action of another person or a robot could potentially influence one’s own sense of agency. We assessed how observing another’s action might change the perceived temporal relationship between one’s own voluntary actions and their outcomes, which has been proposed as an implicit measure of sense of agency. Working in pairs, participants chose between two action alternatives, one rewarded more frequently than the other, while watching a rotating clock hand. They judged, in separate blocks, either the time of their own action, or the time of a tone that followed the action. These were compared to baseline judgements of actions alone, or tones alone, to calculate the perceptual shift of action toward outcome and vice versa. Our design focused on how these two dependent variables, which jointly provide an implicit measure of sense of agency, might be influenced by observing another’s action. In the observational group, each participant could see the other’s actions. Multivariate analysis showed that the perceived time of action and tone shifted progressively toward the actual time of outcome with repeated experience of this social situation. No such progressive change occurred in other groups for whom a barrier hid participants’ actions from each other. However, a similar effect was observed in the group that viewed movements of a human-like robotic hand, rather than actions of another person. This finding suggests that observing the actions of others increases the salience of the external outcomes of action and this effect is not unique to observing human agents. Social contexts in which we see others controlling external events may play an important role in mentally representing the impact of our own actions on the external world.

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“…Precision is psychologically associated with attentional gain and physiologically with the excitability of neuronal populations reporting prediction errors, resulting in a modulation of perceptual variance. Recently, this view has been proposed as the basis of many neuropsychiatric disorders (Adams, Stephan, et al, 2013;Lawson, Rees, & Friston, 2014;Picard & Friston, 2014;Teufel et al, 2015), in addition to agency-related perceptual or cognitive phenomena (e.g., intentional binding, sensory attenuation, or self-other discrimination (Brown, Adams, Parees, Edwards, & Friston, 2013)), especially in terms of "biased" perceptual variance or precision by priors (Wolpe, Haggard, Siebner, & Rowe, 2013).…”

Section: Bayesian Inference From Perception To Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The self as a generative, teleological, and subjective prior: Mutually-modulated temporal agency

Asai

Imaizumi

Imamizu

2019

Preprint

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How can we certify our existence? Recent theoretical studies have suggested that, in the brain, the effect inversely infers the possibility of the existence of the self as the cause. While this Bayesian view of the sense of agency is widely accepted, empirical evidence in support of this theory is still lacking. The current study examined outcome-modulated agency in terms of time perception in seven experiments, with a total of 90 participants. It was hypothesized that perceptual generation, not termination, should subjectively infer the existence of the self, even though both include the same stimuli and are driven by the same teleological action.Results suggest support for the hypothesis (Experiments 1 and 2). Participants judged stronger self-agency, detected less delay, or felt shorter duration for auditory generation, compared with termination, which was driven by the same volitional key-press. Furthermore, the main experiment, Experiment 3, focused on temporal probability distributions both for action and outcome (e.g., standard deviations or relative entropy), and concluded that the observed contrast in onset/offset agency indicates a mutual or bidirectional relationship between cause and effect only during agentive action, characterized by active (i.e., teleological) generation.Finally, the concurrent theoretical models for volitional action-modulated time perception are discussed on the basis of the suggested triplet (generativity, teleology, and subjectivity) dimensions of agency. Extended abstractThe sense of agency refers to the subjective experience of generating one's own actions (Gallagher, 2000).Within the past decade, research on this subject has increased, as increased understanding of human agency could be a window into knowing how we are aware of ourselves, and possibly allowing for a better understanding of mental illnesses, like schizophrenia. However, "free will," "self-consciousness," and/or "volition" are concepts that are always difficult to empirically investigate (Frith & Haggard, 2018).Researchers do not know exactly what occurs in our sensorium during "agentive action." However, three conceptions could represent genuine dimensions of agency: generativity, teleology, and subjectivity (Haggard, 2019).Recent theoretical studies have suggested that, in the brain, the effect inversely infers the possibility of the existence of the self as the cause. This Bayesian view of the sense of agency may provide an explanation for classical statements, such as "ego cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I am)," "cogito cogito, ergo cogito sum (I think that I think, therefore I think that I am)," "I move, therefore I am," or "I predict, therefore I am." (e.g., Corlett, 2017). All of these theoretical claims implicitly refer to the Bayesian "inverse" probability or inference (e.g., "thought as action"), where the effect (perception) retrospectively postdicts the cause (action), as well as the action predicting the following perception (Figure 1, including generativity, teleology, and subjectivity as ...

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Cue integration and the perception of action in intentional binding

Cited by 122 publications

References 21 publications

Neural underpinnings of the ‘agent brain’: new evidence from transcranial direct current stimulation

Neural underpinnings of the ‘agent brain’: new evidence from transcranial direct current stimulation

Social Transmission of Experience of Agency: An Experimental Study

The self as a generative, teleological, and subjective prior: Mutually-modulated temporal agency

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