Cuba's Quest for Economic Independence

LeoGrande, William M.; Thomas, Julie M.

doi:10.1017/s0022216x02006399

Cited by 28 publications

(19 citation statements)

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“…In 2002, however, the minimum monthly income of a state worker was about 100 pesos ($4), whereas university professors earned about 300–560 pesos ($12–$22) and a doctor 300–650 pesos ($12–$25). A tourist taxi driver, by contrast, could expect to make around $100–$400, and a person who rented rooms to tourists could bring in between 250 and several thousand dollars (LeoGrande and Thomas 2002; Mesa‐Lago and Pérez López 2005). At the same time, rations have been reduced to cover only about ten days of food per month, while the real wages of state workers (some 77 percent of the workforce) dropped 44.4 percent between 1988 and 2000 (Mesa‐Lago and Pérez López 2005).…”

Section: The Changing Materials and Moral Economies Of Post‐soviet Cubamentioning

confidence: 99%

The Gift of Health

Andaya

2009

Med Anthropol Q

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Drawing on ethnographic data collected over 13 months of fieldwork in family doctor clinics in Havana from 2004 to 2005, I examine the shifting moral and material economies of Cuban socialist medical practice. In both official ideology and in daily practice, the moral economy of ideal socialist medicine is based on an ethos of reciprocal social exchange-that is, the gift-that informs not only doctors' relationships with the Cuban state and with individual patients but also the state's policies of international medical service to developing nations. The social and economic upheavals after the fall of t Soviet Union, however, have compelled both the state and individual doctors to operate in a new local and global economy. The gift remains the central metaphor of Cuban medical practice. Nonetheless, as ideologies and practices of gifting and reciprocity encounter an emerging market economy, gifts--whether on the level of the state policies of international humanism or in patient-doctor relations--are open to new significations that highlight the shifting material and moral economies of post-Soviet Cuba.

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Section: The Changing Materials and Moral Economies Of Post‐soviet Cubamentioning

confidence: 99%

The Gift of Health

Andaya

2009

Med Anthropol Q

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“…In 1996, Cuba established three free trade zones (FTZ) with lower taxes, and fewer trade restrictions and profit limitations on foreign enterprises. Although Castro had hoped the FTZs would significantly increase foreign investment in manufacturing, the 240 foreign enterprises located in the FTZs, primarily warehouse, imported goods instead of manufacturing [Leogrande and Thomas, 2002].…”

Section: Foreign Investment and Foreign Debtmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As of 1999, 31% of FDI was in the industrial sector while 18% was in the tourist sector. The principal investors are Spain with 23% of Cuban foreign investment, Canada with 19%, and Italy with 15% [Leogrande and Thomas, 2002].…”

Section: Foreign Investment and Foreign Debtmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Cuba?Is the ?Special Period? Really Over?

Benzing

2005

Int Adv Econ Res

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Since 1989, Cuba has struggled to recover from the loss of Soviet trade and subsidies. The Cuban government dubbed the period between 1990 and 1994 BA Special Period in Peacetime^in recognition of the 35% decline in GDP. Instead of restructuring its economy, the Cuban government used a bandaid approach that permitted selfemployment, raised prices, legalized the dollar, and decreased government subsidies of state enterprises. Although growth resumed in 1994, the Cuban economy never fully recovered to pre-1989 levels of GDP. This paper discusses the investment, trade, and production problems that continue to plague the Cuban economy. (JEL O10, F14, F20)

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“…2 2 For more on the sanctions‐busting trade conducted by third parties with Cuba, see Kaplowitz (1998) and Leogrande and Thomas (2002). …”

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confidence: 99%

Unmasking the Black Knights: Sanctions Busters and Their Effects on the Success of Economic Sanctions1

Early

2011

Foreign Policy Analysis

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Despite clear expectations that sanctions busters undermine the effectiveness of economic sanctions, most empirical studies of the phenomenon fail to find that they significantly affect sanctions outcomes. One explanation for these puzzling results is that past studies have almost all relied on Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott's (1990) dichotomous, timeinvariant ''black knight'' variable to operationalize the occurrence of sanctions-busting. This piece develops a more nuanced account of how the timing, quantity, and nature of sanctions-busting trade affects sanctions' outcomes and codes a new set of sanctions-busting variables that capture these distinctions. Two competing accounts of sanctionsbusting are tested in the analysis, one that asserts that only politically motivated sanctions busters (i.e., black knights) negatively affect sanctions' success and one that asserts that commercially and politically motivated sanctions busters jointly undermine their success. These rival accounts are tested using a competing risks analysis of 96 episodes of US-imposed sanctions from 1950 to 2006. The results indicate that while black knights alone do not make sanctions more likely to fail, in conjunction with commercially-motivated sanctions busters they do exercise a potent, negative effect on sanctions' success. These findings have important implications for how third party responses affect sanctions outcomes.Why do economic sanctions so often fail to achieve their objectives? The international cooperation a sender state receives in imposing sanctions against a state and the support a target state receives in resisting them constitute two potentially important explanations. While the comparative effectiveness of bilateral versus multilateral sanctions is one of the central debates within the sanctions literature, much less attention has been paid to how sanctions-busting affects sanctions outcomes-and the findings in that area have been mixed. This is puzzling because spoiler states often figure prominently in qualitative case studies of why economic sanctions failed to work in high-profile cases like the United States' sanctions against Cuba. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union served as Cuba's chief sanctions-busting patron-providing it with billions of dollars worth of subsidies and assistance. Following the Soviet Union's collapse, firms from Canada,

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Cuba's Quest for Economic Independence

Cited by 28 publications

References 0 publications

The Gift of Health

The Gift of Health

Cuba?Is the ?Special Period? Really Over?

Unmasking the Black Knights: Sanctions Busters and Their Effects on the Success of Economic Sanctions1

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