CSR investment decision and coordination strategy for closed-loop supply chain with two competing retailers

Liu, Shan; Yao, Fengmin; Chen, Dongyan

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.127378

Cited by 31 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…For an earlier review of CSR conception, please refer to Frederick (1987). Most studies focus on the supply chain members' CSR strategy, that is, CSR concern (He et al, 2019; Liu & Xiao, 2019; Modak et al, 2014, 2019; Panda et al, 2015, 2017; Wang et al, 2021; Wang & Li, 2021; Ying et al, 2023), CSR investment (Arya & Mittendorf, 2015; Liu et al, 2019, 2021; Ma et al, 2017; Modak et al, 2019; Ni & Li, 2012; Wu et al, 2017, 2020; Yan et al, 2023), CSR sharing (Hsueh & Chang, 2008; Ni et al, 2010; Syed Asif Raza, 2018), and CSR affect (Nie et al, 2019; Yan et al, 2021). Our work uses consumer surplus to measure the CSR of manufacturer and retailer, corelated with the first issue.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Who will undertake corporate social responsibility in supply chain encroachment? Manufacturer or retailer

Cheng,

Pan,

Gong

2024

Manage Decis Econ

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As the sustainable economy has become more of a consensus, supply chain members, both manufacturer (e.g., Apple, Huawei, Xiaomi, Nike, and P&G) and retailer (e.g., Uniqlo, Walmart, and Bravo), are concentrated on corporate social responsibility (CSR). The literature in this area has investigated the role of CSR, but the optimal preference for CSR concern of supply chain members is not well understood, especially when manufacturer sells directly by implementing encroachment. This paper studies the optimal preference for CSR concern of supply chain members with considering manufacturer encroachment. We develop the supply chain with a manufacturer (M) and a retailer (R), where the manufacturer sells products via a retail channel which in turn sells them to the final consumers. The manufacturer can also implement encroachment to meet consumers directly. Meanwhile, by considering the manufacturer or retailer may have CSR concern, we explore four scenarios using a game‐theoretic framework. Several interesting findings are as follows. First, for the sake of profits, retailer CSR should be encouraged, which may achieve Pareto improvement under certain conditions. Notably, manufacturer encroachment may narrow the “win–win” situation. While for the sake of environmental protection and consumer well‐being, manufacturer CSR should be encouraged. Second, manufacturer implementing encroachment may not be blind, because it may be worse for itself when retailer has CSR concern. Third, manufacturer CSR may aggravate the cannibalization effect of encroaching, while retailer CSR may relieve it.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Who will undertake corporate social responsibility in supply chain encroachment? Manufacturer or retailer

Cheng,

Pan,

Gong

2024

Manage Decis Econ

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“…In these activities, CLSC management is critical. Many scholars focus on the field of CLSC (Hong et al, 2021; Jian et al, 2021; S. Liu et al, 2021).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Price Optimization of Closed-loop Supply Chain With Uncertain Demand Under Multi-channel Cross Influence

Shu,

Liang,

Yao

et al. 2023

SAGE Open

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Face ubiquitous demand uncertainty and channel cross-influence, how to make price decision to improve profits has become an issue faced by decision makers. This paper concerns multichannel price optimization for a closed-loop supply chain and constructs the deterministic and uncertain models. Taking a real closed-loop clothing supply chain as an example, we carry out parameter assumptions and numerical experiments and analyze the simulation results. Our analysis reveals: (1) The supply chain is more profitable under centralized policy. The company can maximize profits by expanding upstream and downstream. (2) When experienced experts give more accurate error terms, the companies can accurately predict the demand and make price decisions. (3) Raising wholesale price will not maintain manufacturer’s profits growing. Beyond the threshold, the manufacturer’s profit will decrease. (4) The channel cross-influence is beneficial to the supply chain. When other factors remain unchanged, the greater the cross price-demand sensitivity coefficient in a channel, the higher the retailing price and the total profit of the supply chain will be. Decision makers can adjust pricing in time to adapt to changes of cross-influence and uncertain demand. The findings provide theoretical guidance for each player in the closed-loop supply chain.

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“…The result indicated that both the CSR behavior consciousness of the manufacturer and CSR investment of the retailer can enhance the recycling rate of waste products and improve the performance of members. The research of Liu et al (2021) shows that the operation mode of two retailers considers CSR investment is the best. And their conclusion indicates that the retailers with CSR investment gain more profits than those without CSR investment.…”

Section: Csr and Subsidy In Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Jointing quality effort and contract decision in green agri-food supply chain based on differential game

Yang,

et al. 2023

MSCRA

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PurposeThe managerial questions of this paper are as follows, and the authors are trying to solve them: How revenue sharing contract (CSR) degree and government subsidy affect the agri-food quality? What kind of model (WPC, revenue-sharing contract [RSC] and cooperative) would be more effective in motivating manufacturers and retailer to increase effort and improve agri-food quality? What kind of model (WPC, RSC and cooperative) would make manufacturer and retailer better off?Design/methodology/approachConsidering the jointing quality effort and contract decision in green agri-food supply chain, this paper proposes six models that consider CSR of manufacturer and retailer, and then the obtained optimal solutions are compared and analyzed. At the same time, the impact of government subsidies is analyzed, and corresponding conclusions are drawn.FindingsThe results show that, first of all, whether the increasing CSR of the manufacturer or the retailer can motivate both parties to improve the agri-food quality effort investment. Second, the WPC and RSC contract may play different role in different cases. Finally, under the model with government subsidies, regarding positive influence of government subsidies on efforts of manufacturer and retailer, quality and profits of members is investigated. Based on these conclusions, this study puts forward the following policy suggestions. Firstly, governments should formulate reasonable subsidy policies to support manufacturer and retailer to improve the agri-food quality, thereby promoting green industries' development. Secondly, manufacturer and retailer should actively improve CSR and strengthen the effort of agri-food so as to advance quality. Finally, manufacturer and retailer can choose cooperative model or WPC contract.Research limitations/implicationsIn this paper, one manufacturer and one retailer are considered. Since the agri-food supply chain structure in reality is more complicated, the future research direction can consider the supply chain structure with one manufacturer and multiple retailers. In addition, this paper only considers the subsidy, and future research can classify the subsidy into different types.Originality/valueThe study makes two substantive contributions to the body of knowledge in the field of sustainable operations:(1) incorporating quality-based demand function in supply chain and dynamic process of agri-food quality; (2) exploring the impact of CSR awareness of members and subsidy of government on agri-food quality, and comparing the influence in different models.

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CSR investment decision and coordination strategy for closed-loop supply chain with two competing retailers

Cited by 31 publications

References 40 publications

Who will undertake corporate social responsibility in supply chain encroachment? Manufacturer or retailer

Who will undertake corporate social responsibility in supply chain encroachment? Manufacturer or retailer

Price Optimization of Closed-loop Supply Chain With Uncertain Demand Under Multi-channel Cross Influence

Jointing quality effort and contract decision in green agri-food supply chain based on differential game

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