CSR in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Environmental Externality

Lambertini, Luca; Палестини, Арсен; Tampieri, Alessandro

doi:10.1002/soej.12140

Cited by 59 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 54 publications

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“…However, following a vast literature (e.g. Lambertini and Tampieri 2010Kopel and Brand 2012;Lambertini et al 2016;Fanti and Buccella 2016;Planer-Friedrich and Sahm 2017), we assume that the value of k is common for all the firm which operate within the industry. Thus the CSR objective function (W ) is:…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Bonus Systems

Fanti

Buccella

2018

Ital Econ J

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This paper analyses the effects of managerial delegation on the equilibrium outcomes in a duopoly market in which firms adopt corporate social responsibility (CSR) behaviours (approximately measured, as usual, by their sensitivity to consumer surplus). In particular, the endogenous choice between the most common manager's bonus schemes-i.e. sales delegation (D), "relative profits" (RP) and "pure CSR objective function" (PCSR)-is investigated making use of a standard game-theoretic approach. It is shown that the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is given by the common choice of the RP scheme, whereas the CSR firm's objective function would be highest (lowest) under the PCSR (D) choice. Therefore, the well-known prisoner's dilemma nature of the managerial delegation game holds also when firms adopt CSR behaviours. Overall, these findings shed new light on the issue of the managerial delegation in the recently increasing cases of socially concerned firms.

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Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Bonus Systems

Fanti

Buccella

2018

Ital Econ J

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“…The profits of the domestic and foreign firms are given, respectively, as

π_{1} = p_{1} q_{1}

π_{2} = false(p_{2} - t false) q_{2}

. We say firm i is a CSR firm if its objective is to maximize the sum of its profit

π_{i}

and a share of consumer surplus

CS

, that is,

V_{i} = π_{i} + α C S

, where the consumer surplus in the domestic market is given by

C S = \int_{p_{1}}^{\frac{p_{2} - p_{1}}{δ}} false(x - p_{1} false) d x + \int_{\frac{p_{2} - p_{1}}{δ}}^{1} false[(1 + δ) x - p_{2}]d x .

The parameter

α \in (0, 1]

represents the weight that the CSR firm puts on consumer surplus, which is coined as CSR sensitivity to CS (Kopel & Brand, ; Lambertini, Palestini, & Tampieri, , inter alia ). The consumer‐oriented CSR may include increased product safety, quality standard, or reduced ambient environmental damages.…”

Section: The Basic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate social responsibility, vertical product differentiation and international competition

Wang

Dong

et al. 2019

Rev International Economics

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Would a foreign firm's consumer-oriented corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities be rewarded by an importing country's voluntary tariff reduction? The current paper addresses this question in an import-competing duopoly model with vertical product differentiation. It is shown that the tariff will decrease if the foreign firm switches from a purely profit-driven firm to a CSR firm. A consumer-oriented CSR strategy will always hurt the domestic firm's profit, whereas the relationship between the foreign firm's profit and CSR sensitivity (the degree to which a firm cares about consumer welfare) is invertedly U-shaped. When firms' decisions to switch to CSR are endogeneized, only the foreign firm will become a CSR firm.

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“…In recent debates, researchers have extended the view on CSR and investigated CSR from a supply chain's perspective (Ni and Li, ). In addition to some qualitative discussions (Carter and Jennings, ; Miralles et al., ), some mathematical models have been established to investigate CSR in supply chain management with various issues such as environment (Savaskan et al., ; Cruz, ; Plambeck and Taylor, ), stakeholder (Panda, ; Arya and Mittendorf, ; Panda et al., ; Bian et al., ), and general CSR (Ni and Li, ; Hsueh, ; Lambertini and Tampieri, ; Lambertini et al., ; Ma et al., ). Our article relates more to the research on general CSR because we incorporate both environmental and stakeholder factors into the model.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing, environmental governance efficiency, and channel coordination in a socially responsible tourism supply chain

Liu

Xiao

Fan

et al. 2017

Int Trans Operational Res

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We investigate the pricing and environmental governance efficiency decisions and channel coordination of a dyadic tourism supply chain with corporate social responsibility. We consider two cases: only the theme park exhibits (environmental) social responsibility; and both theme park and tour operator exhibit social responsibility. For each case, we design a coordination mechanism. In the first case, we find that (a) if the environmental governance investment is relatively inexpensive, then the retail price, environmental governance efficiency, and sale quantity may simultaneously increase with the theme park's environmental responsibility (extra investment on the treatment of ungoverned environmental damage) under the centralized system; (b) it is more likely to achieve a win‐win outcome if the theme park cares more about the environment when the channel is coordinated; (c) the theme park's environmental responsibility enables itself to gain more coordination benefit when its negotiation power is relatively high. In the second case, we find that (a) the environmental governance efficiency or sale quantity increases with the tour operator's social responsibility; (b) both members’ profits may increase with the tour operator's social responsibility.

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CSR in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Environmental Externality

Cited by 59 publications

References 54 publications

Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Bonus Systems

Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Bonus Systems

Corporate social responsibility, vertical product differentiation and international competition

Pricing, environmental governance efficiency, and channel coordination in a socially responsible tourism supply chain

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