Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society 2014
DOI: 10.1145/2665943.2665949
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CS-BuFLO

Abstract: Website fingerprinting attacks [10]

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Cited by 115 publications
(18 citation statements)
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References 15 publications
(31 reference statements)
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“…Dyer et al [66] proposed Buffered Fixed-Length Obfuscator (BuFLO), which operated by sending fixed-length packets at a fixed interval for at least a fixed amount of time. Cai et al [65], [126] proposed Congestion-Sensitive BuFLO (CSBuFLO), which optimized BuFLO to make the protocol congestion sensitive, rate adaptive, and efficient at hiding macroscopic website features, such as total size and the size of the last object. Cai et al [115] proposed Tamaraw, based on an extension of the concept of optimal partitioning and feature hiding, which extended and tuned BuFLO to hide the most significant traffic features, the packet size was set at 750 bytes rather than the MTU, outgoing traffic was fixed at a higher packet interval than incoming traffic to reduce the overhead in both bandwidth and time.…”
Section: B Approachesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Dyer et al [66] proposed Buffered Fixed-Length Obfuscator (BuFLO), which operated by sending fixed-length packets at a fixed interval for at least a fixed amount of time. Cai et al [65], [126] proposed Congestion-Sensitive BuFLO (CSBuFLO), which optimized BuFLO to make the protocol congestion sensitive, rate adaptive, and efficient at hiding macroscopic website features, such as total size and the size of the last object. Cai et al [115] proposed Tamaraw, based on an extension of the concept of optimal partitioning and feature hiding, which extended and tuned BuFLO to hide the most significant traffic features, the packet size was set at 750 bytes rather than the MTU, outgoing traffic was fixed at a higher packet interval than incoming traffic to reduce the overhead in both bandwidth and time.…”
Section: B Approachesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Next, we deliver an overview of the space of existing WF defenses and their security/overhead trade-o s. Constant-rate padding. Defenses like BuFLO [8], CS-BuFLO [6], and Tamaraw [7] hide timing patterns and packet transmission burst behavior by leveraging di erent strategies that rely on the transmission of packets at xed-rates. In addition, some of these defenses [6,7] obfuscate the size of websites being transmitted by grouping websites in sets of websites with similar sizes and padding the sites within a set to a common size.…”
Section: Website Fingerprinting Defensesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Defenses like BuFLO [8], CS-BuFLO [6], and Tamaraw [7] hide timing patterns and packet transmission burst behavior by leveraging di erent strategies that rely on the transmission of packets at xed-rates. In addition, some of these defenses [6,7] obfuscate the size of websites being transmitted by grouping websites in sets of websites with similar sizes and padding the sites within a set to a common size. Despite their success in thwarting WF attacks, these defenses incur in large bandwidth and latency overheads that preclude their wide adoption in Tor.…”
Section: Website Fingerprinting Defensesmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…e major packet padding defenses with delay include BuFLO (buffered fixed-length obfuscator) [29], CS-BuFLO (congestion sensitive BuFLO) [31], and Tamaraw [32]. Decoy defenses contain two types.…”
Section: Wfp Defensesmentioning
confidence: 99%