2005
DOI: 10.17487/rfc3972
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Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)

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Cited by 280 publications
(147 citation statements)
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References 6 publications
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“…Similarly to the last presented approach, Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) [60,61,62] do not aim at providing a security policy for security gateways. However, in contrast to BTNS, they increase the protection against active attackers by simplifying certification and making it applicable for each end-device to automatically configure and verify security policies.…”
Section: Cryptographically Generated Addressesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Similarly to the last presented approach, Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) [60,61,62] do not aim at providing a security policy for security gateways. However, in contrast to BTNS, they increase the protection against active attackers by simplifying certification and making it applicable for each end-device to automatically configure and verify security policies.…”
Section: Cryptographically Generated Addressesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The first option proposed by [36] to solve this issue is to use Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs) [6]. This method relies on the use of a signature to prove that all signed addresses have been generated by the same entity.…”
Section: Securing Locator Setsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For a given public/private key pair, the private key is used to sign the locator set, while the public key is hashed so as to generate the 64 low order bits of the ULID. The length of the hash is artificially extended (see [6]) so that the actual hash length is not 64 bits, but instead 59 + 16 ⁄ sec bits (where sec is a tunable parameter). Consequently, the security is dependent on an attacker not being able to find a hash collision with a self-generated public key.…”
Section: Securing Locator Setsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Mechanisms based on cryptography and addresses generated cryptographically have been proposed to avoid identity theft [15,16], but these solutions suffer from the high computational cost of performing asymmetric key operations, cost that can be intolerable in scenarios such as a server with a large number of requests per second. So the adoption of an alternative mechanism that guarantees the link between a set of locators with an identity without incurring in large computational costs is proposed.…”
Section: Security Features Of the Protocolmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Because all these reasons we consider that in the short term, HIP is an inferior solution than the one presented in this paper. In order to overcome the limitations presented by the HIP solution concerning the support for referral and callback applications, it is possible to adopt a middle-ground scheme where the identifiers are also valid locators and they carry a hash of a public key in the lower 64 bits, as in Cryptographic Generated Addresses [16]. Such approach would provide a similar support than the presented approach with respect to applications, but it would still impose the workload required by public key cryptography.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%