Initial coin offerings (ICOs) are a new mode of financing start-ups that saw an explosion in popularity in 2017 but declined in popularity in the second half of 2018 as regulatory pressure, instances of fraud and reports of poor performance began to undermine their reputation. We examine whether ICOs are a passing fad or a worthwhile form of financing with beneficial economic properties.This paper focuses on ICOs where a start-up raises funds by issuing tokens and selling some or all of these tokens to external investors. The start-up commits to accepting tokens as the only means of payment to buy its products or to purchase goods and services on its platform, and commits to not issuing any additional tokens beyond the pre-committed amount.We employ a theoretical framework that was previously used to examine whether companies could be financed with debt or venture capital. This framework allows us to assess how financing a start-up through an ICO affects the incentives of an entrepreneur to lead the start-up to success. The framework also allows us to compare outcomes across ICO financing and conventional financing methods.Our results show that ICOs can have beneficial economic properties when compared with conventional financing strategies. All forms of financing we consider, including ICOs, can be inefficient. However, for certain projects, ICO financing generates a higher net present value than conventional modes of financing and is sometimes the only profitable form of financing. Crucial to this is the fact that the return to token investors under an ICO is based on the sales revenue of a project rather than profits.Our analysis also reveals two potential drawbacks of ICOs. First, there is an upper limit on the fraction of future sales that can be shared with outside investors. Such a constraint is less likely to be binding for platform-like projects, where total sales revenue on the platform can be high, while the platform-owner takes only a small cut of the total sales by facilitating the activity on the platform. Second, there is the risk of token investors trying to increase their payoffs by cornering the market for tokens. Token ownership needs to be sufficiently widely dispersed to avoid such market manipulation.Finally, our results show how the tokens issued in an ICO can become valuable without the start-up explicitly specifying how much value each token represents, as is the case in crowdfunding-like ICO schemes where a token represents a unit of output. In equilibrium, the tokens derive value from the mere fact that the start-up may create future transactional demand for the tokens. When ICOs first broke onto the scene, this contributed to the perception that ICOs allowed companies to obtain "money for nothing," because it allowed start-ups to raise funds without giving away ownership in the company. Our results debunk this notion by showing that the commitment to accept the tokens as the sole means of payment is in fact costly to both the start-up and its customers. As a result, ICO funding generat...