Cryptanalysisof two mutual authentication protocols for low-cost RFID

Abstract

ABSTRACT

SE-H: A Secure and Efficient Hash Protocol for RFID System

“…(2) The IDT is renewed after each successful authentication by the back-end server and the tag itself; (3) the IDT is concealed during the transmission by the AK that is changed in each authentication session according to the TST; (4) the KT is renewed after each successful authentication; (5) the IDR is protected by the hash function during the transmission where the hash value is changed according to the value of TRT that is generated by the reader itself; (6) if the authentication is fail, the existing identities and keys of the tag and reader will be used for next authentication session with fresh authentication parameters such as the TST, TRT and AK; (7) the mutual authentication must be achieved between all authentication entities. Therefore, the proposed protocol can prevent the following:…”

“…(1) unauthorized reader cannot replay the tag identity; (2) the unauthorized tag cannot replay the reader identity; (3) the attacker cannot track the tag holder; (4) the tag and reader identities or the secret keys of unsuccessful authentication session cannot be used by the attacker; (5) the authentication messages of the previous authentication session cannot be resent by the attacker; (6) the attacker cannot force the backend server and tag to renew the tag identity when the authentication is fail; (7) the attacker cannot impersonate the tag, reader and server due to cannot retrieve the reader identity or compute the anonymity key. Consequently, the proposed protocol can resist all current attacks such as impersonate, desynchronization, tracking and replay attacks.…”

Practical Attacks on a RFID Authentication Protocol Conforming to EPC C-1 G-2 Standard

“…Many RFID authentication protocols have been proposed until now [14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24]. Although mentioned protocols have wanted to provide secure and untraceable communication for RFID systems; many weaknesses have been found in them [25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38].However, Yeh et al [1] have recently proposed a RFID mutual authentication protocol compatible with EPC C-1 G-2 standard that we name SRP (Securing RFID Protocol) in this paper. The authors have claimed that not only does not reveal SRP any information but also it has forward secrecy characteristic.…”

Attacks on a Lightweight Mutual Authentication Protocol under EPC C-1 G-2 Standard

“…Although these protocols tried to provide secure and untraceable communication for RFID systems, however many weaknesses have been found in them [16,17,18,19,20,21]. In this context, Yeh et al have recently proposed a RFID mutual authentication protocol compatible with EPC C-1 G-2 standard [22] that we name SRP (Securing RFID Protocol) in this paper.…”