Abstract:There are strong arguments in favour of the need for more 'empirically informed philosophy'. Using papers in the current issue of JECP as case studies, I raise fundamental and unresolved methodological questions about the proper relationship between philosophy and empirical research, in particular concerning the relationship between 'data' in empirical research and the 'responses' people give in to questions in the process of philosophical dialogue. There are tensions between the role of data in empirical rese… Show more
“…The ‘empirical turn’ is characterized by the notion that it possesses a distinctive difference from descriptive ethics because it seeks to develop normative understanding through its ‘real world’ questioning. In a recent commentary on our article, in which we described and discussed work we had undertaken that might be understood as an example of the ‘empirical turn’, Michael Loughlin seems to have no difficulty in principle with philosophy that is informed by empirical contexts . He writes:‘The sort of “applied philosophy” that is done in ignorance of, or with indifference to, everyday experience, and in particular that which ignores the social facts that delimit the options and shape the environments of decision makers, is typically of no use to anyone.…”
Section: The ‘Empirical Turn’ In Bioethics and Loughlin's Dilemmamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…… Empirically informed philosophy seems, then, to be quite obviously preferable to the empirically uninformed or misinformed variety. …’ (: p. 970).…”
Section: The ‘Empirical Turn’ In Bioethics and Loughlin's Dilemmamentioning
In a recent issue of this journal, Michael Loughlin offers a critique of work we undertook that we described and discussed in the same issue, and which might be seen as forming part of the so-called empirical turn in ethics. Here we respond to Loughlin's criticisms of our work. While he declares that generally, there is potential value in empirically informed ethics, we understand him to be concerned about our particular project on two counts. First, he is worried by the extent to which participants exercised responsibility within the work; and second, he is concerned about the degree to which we, as researchers, were prepared rigorously to examine and question participant assertions and assumptions. We argue that Loughlin's worries are based on a relatively limited view of the context in which empirically informed ethics related to health care takes place. A more complex understanding than he allows, of both the responsibility of participants and the vulnerability of researchers who are involved in projects of empirical ethics in this context, is required in order to recognize the ambiguities and difficulties faced by those involved in such projects.
“…The ‘empirical turn’ is characterized by the notion that it possesses a distinctive difference from descriptive ethics because it seeks to develop normative understanding through its ‘real world’ questioning. In a recent commentary on our article, in which we described and discussed work we had undertaken that might be understood as an example of the ‘empirical turn’, Michael Loughlin seems to have no difficulty in principle with philosophy that is informed by empirical contexts . He writes:‘The sort of “applied philosophy” that is done in ignorance of, or with indifference to, everyday experience, and in particular that which ignores the social facts that delimit the options and shape the environments of decision makers, is typically of no use to anyone.…”
Section: The ‘Empirical Turn’ In Bioethics and Loughlin's Dilemmamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…… Empirically informed philosophy seems, then, to be quite obviously preferable to the empirically uninformed or misinformed variety. …’ (: p. 970).…”
Section: The ‘Empirical Turn’ In Bioethics and Loughlin's Dilemmamentioning
In a recent issue of this journal, Michael Loughlin offers a critique of work we undertook that we described and discussed in the same issue, and which might be seen as forming part of the so-called empirical turn in ethics. Here we respond to Loughlin's criticisms of our work. While he declares that generally, there is potential value in empirically informed ethics, we understand him to be concerned about our particular project on two counts. First, he is worried by the extent to which participants exercised responsibility within the work; and second, he is concerned about the degree to which we, as researchers, were prepared rigorously to examine and question participant assertions and assumptions. We argue that Loughlin's worries are based on a relatively limited view of the context in which empirically informed ethics related to health care takes place. A more complex understanding than he allows, of both the responsibility of participants and the vulnerability of researchers who are involved in projects of empirical ethics in this context, is required in order to recognize the ambiguities and difficulties faced by those involved in such projects.
“…Arguably, the sciences seek to give us adequate descriptions of the world 2 – and the term ‘sciences’ here includes social sciences and psychology, which seek to give us descriptions of the social world and the human psyche. Philosophical enquiry is, in contrast, typically normative in nature [48], addressing in a very immediate way questions phrased most appropriately in the first person: what should I/we think about issue X? The question of what people in a given time or place do, as a matter of fact, think is part of the subject matter of psychology, but no amount of knowledge about this question can tell us what we should think about the matter.…”
Section: Empirical Philosophy? Research Evidence Epistemology and Etmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In 2010, the journal presented its first ever philosophy thematic edition, including papers by some of the most original and incisive thinkers the discipline has to offer on a vast range of subjects of urgent practical import [11]. This, the second thematic edition of the Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice to focus specifically on the application of philosophical methods and argumentation to medicine and health care, provides an even greater range of papers [25–60] on the themes of progress in medicine, virtue in practice, and evidence and methodology in research and evaluation. Articles bring fresh and challenging analyses of the relationship between progress in the science and the practice of medicine, the role and limitations of statistical reasoning in medical research, patient involvement, autonomy and rationality, the relationship between reason and emotional engagement in the life of the good practitioner, the role and value of uncertainty in health care and how to promote virtue in practice.…”
“…The assumption that philosophy, especially in certain fields such as ethics, must be "empirically informed" is not in fact controversial advice (LOUGHLIN 2011). But this is different with the emergent field of X-Phi, or experimental philosophy (EP) (LACKMAN 2006;KNOBE 2004;KNOBE & NICHOLS 2008;APPIAH 2007APPIAH , 2010.…”
UNISINOSRESUMO: Filósofos, especialmente aqueles que se autodenominam como naturalistas, parecem cada vez mais interessados em realizar pesquisas empíricas. Um caso típico é o da Filosofia Experimental, um campo emergente que faz uso de dados empíricos colhido por meio de inquéritos seguindo os mesmos métodos empregados nas ciências empíricas, nomeadamente na psicologia, a fim de apresentar provas em pesquisas ou argumentos filosóficos. Outro exemplo é oferecido pela participação ativa dos filósofos em grupos de pesquisa interdisciplinares nas neurociências. No entanto, os filósofos não são especialistas em metodologia de pesquisa empírica. Isso é transparente nos estudos mais representativos em filosofia experimental. Neste artigo, faremos algumas observações de advertência sobre as complexidades da metodologia das ciências empíricas. A recomendação final é de que é sábia a atitude de envolver-se em grupos de pesquisa interdisciplinares, buscando dominar as peculiaridades dos mais diversos delineamentos de pesquisa empírica nas diferentes áreas da ciência. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Filosofia Experimental, Ciências empíricas, Naturalismo, Metodologia Filosófica, Metodologia Científica, Metafilosofia.ABSTRACT: Philosophers, especially those who classify themselves as naturalists, seem to be increasingly interested in conducting empirical researches. One case is Experimental Philosophy, an emerging field that makes use of empirical data gathered through surveys following the same methods employed in the empirical sciences, notably in psychology, in order to present evidence in philosophical arguments or inquiries. Another example is offered by the active participation of philosophers in interdisciplinary research groups in the neurosciences. Nevertheless, philosophers are not experts in the methodology of empirical research. This is transparent in the most representative studies in experimental philosophy. In this paper, we present some cautionary remarks on the complexities of the methodology of the empirical sciences. The final recommendation is that to engage in interdisciplinary research groups, seeking to master the peculiarities of the many empirical research designs in the most different areas of science, is the wisest attitude.
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