Criticism and Captivity: On Genealogy and Critical Theory

Abstract

The aim of this essay 1 is to elucidate the logical structure of genealogy as a practice of critical reflection and, in doing so, to illustrate, dispel and account for the confusion concerning this practice which has characterised its reception, perhaps especially among philosophers working within the tradition of the Frankfurt School. The essay advances five claims which can be stated in summary as follows:1. Setting aside the cases of contingent error and of ignorance, we can note that there are (at least) two logically distinct forms of self-imposed, non-physical constraint on our capacity for self-government: being held captive by an ideology (i.e., false consciousness) and being held captive by a picture or perspective (i.e., what one might call 'restricted consciousness'). 2. Critical Theory as ideologiekritik 2 is directed to freeing us from captivity to an ideology; genealogy is directed to freeing us from captivity to a picture or perspective. 3 3. Philosophers working within the tradition of Critical Theory have typically misinterpreting genealogy as a (empirically insightful but normatively confused) form of ideologiekritik. 4. This category mistake is the product of an illicit generalisation of ideological captivity as the only form of self-imposed, non-physical constraint on our capacity for self-government. 5. Once this 'craving for generality' is dispelled, we are able to grasp both genealogy and Critical Theory as addressing distinct aspects of enlightenment and involving distinct kinds of dialogue. 4The argument of this essay is presented in five parts, each corresponding to one of the theses summarised above. ILet us consider the class of types of self-imposed, non-physical constraint on our capacity for self-government. The argument advanced here is that we can distinguish at least two members of this class, namely, being held captive by an ideology and being held captive by a picture or perspective, which I'll refer to as European Journal of Philosophy 10:2 ISSN 0966-8373 pp. 216-230

Emancipating Intellectual Property from Proprietarianism: Drahos, Foucault, and a Quasi-Genealogy of IP

“…It may sound clichéd but, to paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, one can only do what one has. 13 However, if Drahos is seeking to account for that "more" in individuals' harnessing of power, in my understanding he fails, because he relies solely on the mechanism of intellectual property for his 11 For an interesting debate on Foucault's notion of power, see Charles Taylor and Paul Patton's essays (Taylor 2014a(Taylor , 2014bPatton 2014aPatton , 2014b) that have been re-published in David Owen's edited work, Michel Foucault (Owen 2014). Patton (2014a) rectifies Taylor (2014a) misconception of Foucault's notion of power first by pointing out that power for Foucault "creates subjects" and, second, by distinguishing "power to" from "power over."…”

What Is Genealogy? An Anthropological/Philosophical Reconsideration

“…Even in an "Anthropology of the Good", genealogies would potentially include the lineal connection between beliefs and applications of value within and across wide-ranging cultures, and, even, individuals. The power of genealogies to render existing lines of connection problematic-as foregrounded by Foucault, highlighted by Owen [64] and reanalyzed by Koopman [1]-is easily complemented by their imprecision and potential incommensurability, both in structure of temporal sequence and concerning the units that are taken to inform or 'bequeath' connections over time. Exactly what is it that 'begets', what is 'begot' over time?…”

The Difference Genealogy Makes: Strategies for Politicisation or How to Extend Capacities for Autonomy

“…Therefore, a (contested) field of inquiry and possibilities is opened and the capacity exists for things to be different. Thus politicisation can be described as what Owen (2002) called the freeing of our captivity from a picture or perspective. This means that things become ‘the subject of deliberation, decision‐making and human agency where previously they were not’ (Hay, 2007, p. 81).…”

“…As such, the purpose of Foucault's genealogical work is to provide: first, a narrative which explains what frames our ways of making sense of ourselves as political agents; and, second, an evaluation of this which emphasises the restrictiveness of this frame and overcomes it (Owen, 2002, p. 223). In describing his desire for a generative style of criticism, Foucault declares:…”