Criteria for an effective theory of consciousness and some preliminary attempts

Coward, L. Andrew; Sun, Ron

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2003.09.002

Cited by 18 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 65 publications

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“…Natural selection will also favour brains that can learn with the least accidental interference between prior and later learning, that can be built from DNA "blueprints" with few errors, and that can recover from component failures and damage. There are therefore pressures exerted by natural selection on brains that are analogous with the resource limitation, modifiability, constructability, and repairability considerations for computational systems, making it probable that analogous modular hierarchies in human mind/brains do exist, and furthermore, such modular hierarchies can in effect operate as hierarchies of description as mentioned before (see also Coward and Sun 2004, Sun et al 2005, Sun 2002). …”

Section: Theories In the Physical Sciencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To make some causal relationships implicit in, for example, the Block definition of consciousness [1995] explicit, consider the following scenario discussed in Coward and Sun [2004]. In the scenario, a person is out walking with a companion, and encounters a tree partially blocking the path.…”

Section: General Form Of a Scientific Theory Of Consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The key requirement is therefore to define higher-level entities in such a way that the approximation is adequate for some purposes (e.g., some practical purposes). The route to higher precision is to shift to a description in terms of more detailed entities and their interactions, but at this level of detail only descriptions of small segments of an overall phenomenon will be comprehensible (Coward and Sun 2004).…”

Section: Theories In the Physical Sciencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The result of the combination of resource constraints, modifiability, repairability, and constructability is thus a modular hierarchy. This modular hierarchy, in effect, can function as a hierarchy of descriptions, in which high-level descriptions of a feature/functionality can be created based only on high-level modules, but with the possibility of shifting to descriptions based on more detailed modules (for example, for greater accuracy), along with a way of making a shift amongst descriptions at different levels (Coward and Sun 2004).…”

Section: Theories In the Physical Sciencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Hierarchical approaches to understanding consciousness

Coward

Sun

2007

Neural Networks

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There has been much discussion of what a scientific theory of consciousness would look like, and even whether such a theory is possible. Some common misunderstandings of the nature of theories (e.g., in the physical sciences) have confused the discussion of theories concerning consciousness. Theories in the physical sciences establish hierarchies of descriptions that relate high-level descriptions of macro-level phenomena to detailed-level descriptions at a micro level. Detailed descriptions are usually more accurate but information-dense and therefore often beyond human comprehensibility (unless limited to tiny segments of a macrolevel phenomenon). High-level descriptions are usually much less information-dense but more approximate. The ability to map between levels of description, and in particular the understanding of when a shift from a higher-level to a more detailed description is needed to achieve a desired degree of accuracy, is fundamental to an effective theory in any field. The form of such a theory of consciousness is sketched, and the limitations of some alternative approaches described. IntroductionThere are a range of possible approaches aimed at understanding consciousness. At one extreme, there has been debate over whether a scientific theory of consciousness is possible in principle [e.g. Chalmers 1995]. Another type of approach has been the creation of models that describe cognitive operations regarded as being conscious, but with limited consideration for how physiology could support the processes required by the model. Computer implementations of some of these models have been attempted [e.g. Franklin et al 1999, Sun 1999]. Yet another approach has been to look for physiological activity that discriminates between conscious and unconscious states, the so-called "neural correlates of consciousness" [e.g. Rees et al, 2002, Crick et al 1998]. Yet another approach has been to claim that understanding of consciousness is only possible with reference to quantum mechanics [Penrose 1994]. Furthermore, there have been extensive debates over what phenomena should actually be labeled "conscious" [e.g. Block 1995]. The end result has been considerable metatheoretical confusion.For several centuries, the physical sciences have been regarded as the paradigm for valid scientific theories. We believe that much of the confusion over scientific understanding of consciousness derives from misunderstanding of what theories in the physical sciences actually deliver, and once these misunderstandings are cleared away, the form which a theory of consciousness must take becomes clearer. There are some good questions about whether a scientific theory of consciousness is possible, but these questions are in fact more empirical than philosophical, and relate to whether the brain is organized in such a way that understanding can occur within the limits of human information handling capabilities.There are some significant similarities between theories in the physical sciences and the theoretical techniques by whi...

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Section: Theories In the Physical Sciencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: General Form Of a Scientific Theory Of Consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theories In the Physical Sciencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theories In the Physical Sciencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Hierarchical approaches to understanding consciousness

Coward

Sun

2007

Neural Networks

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“…A hierarchy of descriptions of the same phenomenon from psychological to physiological is needed, with clear mapping between the levels (Coward and Sun 2004;Sun et al 2005). At any one level, it must be possible to describe how at each point in time the observed situation causes the situation at the next point in time, in other words, descriptions must be causal.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modelling Memory and Learning Consistently from Psychology to Physiology

Coward

2010

Perception-Action Cycle

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Natural selection pressures have resulted in the physical resources of the brain being organized into modules that perform different general types of information processes. Each module is made up of submodules performing different information processes of the general type, and each submodule is made up of yet more detailed modules. At the highest level, modules correspond with major anatomical structures like the cortex, hippocampus, basal ganglia, cerebellum etc. In the cortex, for example, the more detailed modules include areas, columns, neurons, and a series of neuron substructures down to molecules. Any one memory or learning phenomenon requires many information processes performed by many different anatomical structures. However, the modular structure makes it possible to describe a memory phenomenon at a high (psychological) level in terms of the information processes performed by the major anatomical structures. The same phenomenon can be described at each level in a hierarchy of more detailed descriptions, in terms of the information processes performed by anatomical substructures. At higher levels, descriptions are approximate but can be mapped to more detailed, more precise descriptions as required down to neuron levels and below. The total information content of a high level description is small enough that it can be fully understood. Small parts of a high level phenomenon, when described at a more detailed level, also have a small enough information content to be understood. The information processes and resultant hierarchy of descriptions therefore make it possible to understand cognitive phenomena like episodic, semantic or working memory in terms of neuron processes via a series of intermediate levels of description.

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Embodying Intelligence in Autonomous and Robotic Systems with the Use of Cognitive Psychology and Motivation Theories

Kowalczuk

Czubenko

2017

Advances in Data Analysis With Computational Intelligence Methods

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Criteria for an effective theory of consciousness and some preliminary attempts

Cited by 18 publications

References 65 publications

Hierarchical approaches to understanding consciousness

Hierarchical approaches to understanding consciousness

Modelling Memory and Learning Consistently from Psychology to Physiology

Embodying Intelligence in Autonomous and Robotic Systems with the Use of Cognitive Psychology and Motivation Theories

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