Crisis prevention and the Austrian State Treaty

Larson, Deborah Welch

doi:10.1017/s0020818300000734

Cited by 41 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Deborah Larson explored the role of a GRIT strategy employed by Soviet leaders in making possible the Austrian State Treaty in 1955. 33 She finds GRIT was effective, but less because it overcame cognitive barriers among US leaders to changing their image of the Soviet Union than because it led to domestic and international pressures to follow a norm of reciprocity in responding to Soviet concessions. The most widely studied case, with the conclusion debated by several studies, is whether the use of a GRIT-like strategy by Mikhail Gorbachev proved effective.…”

Section: Downloaded By [Queensland University Of Technology] At 04:24mentioning

confidence: 99%

Varieties of Assurance

Knopf

2012

Journal of Strategic Studies

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Section: Downloaded By [Queensland University Of Technology] At 04:24mentioning

confidence: 99%

Varieties of Assurance

Knopf

2012

Journal of Strategic Studies

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“…For a few examples, see Rocke 1990, 1995;Evangelista 1990;Keohane 1984Keohane , 1986Larson 1987;Rhodes 1989;and Weber 1991. 8. Important exceptions include Krasner 1991;Garrett 1992;Sebenius 1992;andMorrow 1994.…”

Section: Strategic Structure and Problems Of International Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation

Fearon¹

1998

Int Org

778

360

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Neoliberals and their neorealist critics have debated the relative importance of two main obstacles to international cooperation—problems of cheating and enforcement and problems of relative gains. By contrast, I argue that problems of international cooperation have a common strategic structure in which a third, distinct obstacle plays a crucial role. Almost regardless of the issue area, states must first resolve the bargaining problem of agreeing on terms before they can implement and begin to enforce an agreement. Furthermore, the bargaining and enforcement problems interact. Using a game model, I show that if states must bargain to determine the deal to be enforced, the “shadow of the future” cuts two ways. A high expectation of continued interactions may make enforcing the agreement easier, but it can also give states an incentive to bargain harder, delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal. Empirical evidence from trade and arms control negotiations suggests that this mechanism may help to explain the costly standoffs that are often observed in international politics and are problematic for received neoliberal theories.

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“…For example, even though there has been widespread interest in Osgood's Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-reduction [GRIT] (Osgood 1962;Lindskold 1986), and Larson (1987) argues that GRIT usefully explains cases of international negotiation, there is no systematic effort to build an approach to ethnic con ict resolution around it (although Kelman (1982) draws on it in designing proposals to advance the Middle East peace process). However, it is important to note that many practitioners use GRIT's insights to get opposing groups to undertake small condence-building measures as a step to de-escalating tensions, increasing trust and moving towards an agreement on outstanding issues (Rothchild and Lake 1998).…”

Section: Six Theories Of Ethnic Con Ict Resolutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Creating the conditions for peacemaking: theories of practice in ethnic conflict resolution

Ross¹

2000

Ethnic and Racial Studies

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Establishing the conditions for effective intergroup peacemaking is a formidable task in severe ethnic con icts. Con ict resolution practitioners argue that a critical rst step is developing preconditions which convince competing groups that there are opponents to whom it is worth talking, that it is possible to create structural changes conducive to a stable peace, and that an agreement is possible which can meet each side's basic concerns and needs. This article compares six theories of practice of ethnic con ict resolution: community relations, principled negotiation; human needs; psychoanalytically rooted identity; intercultural miscommunications and con ict transformation, examining how each understands ethnic con ict; the goals it articulates; the effects of good practice on participants in interventions; the mechanisms by which the project achieves its impact; and the dynamics of transfer affecting the course of a wider con ict. It is argued that clearer articulation of these assumptions will improve both theory and practice in the search for settlements to severe ethnic con ict.

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Crisis prevention and the Austrian State Treaty

Cited by 41 publications

References 13 publications

Varieties of Assurance

Varieties of Assurance

Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation

Creating the conditions for peacemaking: theories of practice in ethnic conflict resolution

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