Abstract:Criminals have taken advantage of the Internet's features to create worldwide marketplaces where illegal goods and services can be instantly bought and sold anonymously. This article focuses on an online forum that served as a transactional platform for criminals involved in the illicit trade of credit and banking information. Using Gambetta's adaptation of the signalling theory, this research develops a predictive model identifying the signs and signals that can enhance a criminal's performance in this crimin… Show more
“…A potential behavioural pitfall for miscreants is that they trust the wrong people, send them personal information and do business with them. Because of the nature of the anonymous environment, users may fail to identify that other users are scammers or undercover law enforcement (Décary--Hétu & Leppänen, 2016;Lusthaus, 2012). For example, once a drop address has been sent to an undercover agent, they can surveil the place and identify the individual that picks up the delivered packages.…”
This work presents an overview of some of the tools that cybercriminals employ in order to trade securely. It will look at the weaknesses of these tools and how the behaviour of cybercriminals will sometimes lead them to use tools in a non--optimal manner, creating opportunities for law enforcement to identify and apprehend them. The criminal domain this article focuses on is carding, the online trade in stolen payment card details and the consequent criminal misuse of such data. However, these findings could be applied more broadly, as many of the analysed tools are used across (cyber)criminal domains. This paper is a continuation of earlier work (van Hardeveld, Webber & O'Hara, 2016), in which a crime script analysis of 25 carding tutorials presented the tools that cybercriminals use to cash--out stolen payment card details while remaining anonymous. We use these tutorials and an analysis of the literature to identify how they can be used incorrectly and create a typology of potential behavioural and technological pitfalls in these tools. Finally, we conclude that finding pitfalls in the usage of tools by cybercriminals has the potential to increase the efficiency of disruption, interception and prevention approaches. However, in future work, interviews with law enforcement experts and convicted cybercriminals or still active users should be used to analyse the operational security of cybercriminals in more depth.
“…A potential behavioural pitfall for miscreants is that they trust the wrong people, send them personal information and do business with them. Because of the nature of the anonymous environment, users may fail to identify that other users are scammers or undercover law enforcement (Décary--Hétu & Leppänen, 2016;Lusthaus, 2012). For example, once a drop address has been sent to an undercover agent, they can surveil the place and identify the individual that picks up the delivered packages.…”
This work presents an overview of some of the tools that cybercriminals employ in order to trade securely. It will look at the weaknesses of these tools and how the behaviour of cybercriminals will sometimes lead them to use tools in a non--optimal manner, creating opportunities for law enforcement to identify and apprehend them. The criminal domain this article focuses on is carding, the online trade in stolen payment card details and the consequent criminal misuse of such data. However, these findings could be applied more broadly, as many of the analysed tools are used across (cyber)criminal domains. This paper is a continuation of earlier work (van Hardeveld, Webber & O'Hara, 2016), in which a crime script analysis of 25 carding tutorials presented the tools that cybercriminals use to cash--out stolen payment card details while remaining anonymous. We use these tutorials and an analysis of the literature to identify how they can be used incorrectly and create a typology of potential behavioural and technological pitfalls in these tools. Finally, we conclude that finding pitfalls in the usage of tools by cybercriminals has the potential to increase the efficiency of disruption, interception and prevention approaches. However, in future work, interviews with law enforcement experts and convicted cybercriminals or still active users should be used to analyse the operational security of cybercriminals in more depth.
“…Specifically, the capacity figures are dependent on what the sellers have reported as the available stock and we consider them as part of communication with the buyers. It has been also indicated in previous studies that cybercriminals are expected to attract companions in crime through successful communication (Décary-Hétu and Leppänen, 2013).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 82%
“…Our main goal in this study was to analyse the impact of the seller's reputation and capacity on daily drug sales. Theoretically, the article was grounded on previous work done on trust systems (Resnick, 2000;Houser and Wooders, 2006;Décary-Hétu and Leppänen, 2013;Lusthaus, 2012) and previous research showing that the seller's reputation has a positive impact on sales in drug markets (Hardy and Norgaard, 2015). We also consider the seller's daily capacity (i.e., the reported sales potential), which has been shown to have an interaction with consumer behaviour (Yu et al, 2015), but this effect has not previously been studied in a cryptomarket setting.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Anonymity directs users' attention to the available features and typically also enforces group behaviour (Keipi and Oksanen, 2014;Spears et al, 2002). Hence, in cryptomarket, trust system is based on both direct feedback and successful communication (Hardy and Norgaard, 2015;Resnick, 2000;Houser and Wooders, 2006;Décary-Hétu and Leppänen, 2013;Lusthaus, 2012). Our hypotheses were grounded on these premises, and we expected that a positive seller reputation would be positively associated with that entity's daily sales.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 94%
“…Besides user feedback, it is often important to communicate well with the customer and create an impression of trustworthiness. According to Décary-Hétu and Leppänen, successful online criminals have communicative skills that lead to higher rewards (Décary-Hétu and Leppänen, 2013).…”
Aims: This 11-month study analysed illicit drug sales on the anonymous Tor network, with a focus on investigating whether a seller's reputation and capacity increased daily drug sales. Design and setting: The data was gathered from Silkkitie, the Finnish version of the Silk Road, by web crawling the site on a daily basis from November 2014 to September 2015). The data includes information on sellers (n=260) and products (n=3823). Measurements: The measurements include the sellers' reputation, the sale amounts (in euros), the number of available products and the types of drugs sold. The sellers' capacity was measured using their full sales potential (in euros). Fixed-effects regression models were used to estimate the effects of sellers' reputation and capacity; these models were adjusted for the types of drugs sold. Findings: Overall, illicit drug sales totalled over 2 million euros during the study, but many products were not sold at all, and sellers were active for only a short time on average (mean=62.8 days). Among the products sold, stimulants were most widely purchased, followed by cannabis, MDMA, and psychedelics. A seller's reputation and capacity were both associated with drug sales. Conclusion: The Tor network has enabled a transformation in drug sales. Due to the network's anonymity, the seller's reputation and capacity both have an impact on sales.
Governments and private firms have sought to regulate online piracy through legislation, police enforcement, and lawsuits. This article evaluates the effectiveness of large-scale police operations that targeted the warez scene, the community of hackers responsible for much of the copyrighted content illegally distributed online. Using interrupted time series, we find no significant direct or indirect impact of large-scale police operations on the warez scene. We explain the lack of direct impact by the number of arrests made during the police operations. We explain the indirect impact of police operations by the high turnover of warez groups, the vacuum created by the removal of large, established warez groups, the online nature of the warez scene, and the constrains in deterrence power online.KEY WORDS: police operations, impact of police operations, warez, interrupted time series, deterrence, intellectual property fraud
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