Criminalizing price‐fixing

Abstract

We assess whether recent US Department of Justice (DOJ) price‐fixing cases exhibit characteristics that are associated theoretically with optimal use of criminal law. We take our welfare standard from seminal work on optimal legal design. Optimal legal design recognizes the private and public elements present in all areas of the law. The mixed results show that the characteristics to be expected in criminal cases are not all present in the DOJ cases. Criminal sanctions applied in these collusive antitrust cases do however show significant responsiveness to some of the variables derived from the economic analysis of criminal law.

Measuring the effects of information exchange on incentives to collude using calibrated simulations (with an example of the South African oil industry)

“…28 28 For a study on the use of criminal law sanctions in antitrust cases involving collusions, see Dnes and Swaray (2020). …”