Credit Rationing and Credit View: Empirical Evidence from an Ethical Bank in Italy

Becchetti, Leonardo; Garcia, Maria Melody; Trovato, Giovanni

doi:10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00423.x

Cited by 44 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Becchetti, Garcia, andTrovato (2011), using Italian data, andJimenez et al (2012), using Spanish data, base their analyses on individual loan application records. Becchetti, Garcia, and Trovato (2011) investigate the relationship between the European Central Bank refinancing rate and credit rationing by banks, using the difference between the amounts requested by borrowers and the loan amounts granted by the banks. They find that the refinancing rate is positively related to credit rationing, although they conclude that the effect arises from a borrower's balance sheet effect rather than from a bank balance sheet effect.…”

Section: Non-us Evidence On Bank Lending and The Transmission Of Momentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Banks in the Transmission of Monetary Policy

Peek

Rosengren

2015

The Oxford Handbook of Banking, Second Edition

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may The Role of Banks in the Transmission of Monetary Policy Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengren AbstractThe transmission of monetary policy, especially in light of recent events, has received increased attention, especially with respect to the efficacy of the bank lending channel. This paper summarizes the issues associated with isolating the bank lending channel and determining the extent to which it is operational. Evidence on the effectiveness of the bank lending channel is presented, both in the United States and abroad. The paper then provides observations about the likely consequences for the effectiveness of the lending channel of the changes in the financial environment associated with the recent financial crisis.

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Section: Non-us Evidence On Bank Lending and The Transmission Of Momentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Banks in the Transmission of Monetary Policy

Peek

Rosengren

2015

The Oxford Handbook of Banking, Second Edition

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“…members/shareholders and savers) and socially-responsible borrowers (Cornée and Szafarz, 2013). Thus, social banks are special in the midst of cooperative banks, since their foundational principles go beyond the rigorous application of conventional cooperative principles, as they explicitly prioritise social aims over financial ones (Becchetti et al, 2011;San-Jose et al, 2011;Weber and Remer, 2011).…”

Section: Soft Information In Social Bankingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Soft Information and Default Prediction in Cooperative and Social Banks

Cornée¹

2014

JEOD

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In this paper, to begin with, we define soft information as qualitative, subjective information produced by banks through the establishment of long-term lending relationships. We then highlight the importance of soft information for cooperative and social banks in the screening, pricing and monitoring of their borrowers as a result of their institutional features (governance, values, etc.) and the specificities of their clientele. We finally emphasise the value of qualitative (economic, social and/or environmental) factors stemming from the production of soft information in predicting credit default events. AbstractIn this paper, to begin with, we define soft information as qualitative, subjective information produced by banks through the establishment of long-term lending relationships. We then highlight the importance of soft information for cooperative and social banks in the screening, pricing and monitoring of their borrowers as a result of their institutional features (governance, values, etc.) and the specificities of their clientele. We finally emphasise the value of qualitative (economic, social and/or environmental) factors stemming from the production of soft information in predicting credit default events.

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“…3 We show that all contracts in the two menus break-even type-by-type and that the menu for ethical lenders contains the RSW allocation with market segmentation (see below). Instead, the menu for standard lenders always contains a pooling contract, since for standard lenders the two types of borrowers are equivalent, as it will be clear in what follows.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hence, we conclude that the equilibrium outcome with market segmentation is necessarily unique. Finally, we study the e¢ ciency properties of the unique 3 Each menu also contains the null contract which works as an "exit option" and allow for market segmentation. 4 In particular, the menu o¤ered to ethical banks contains two self-selecting contracts and the null one.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Informed Principals in the Credit Market When Borrowers and Lenders are Heterogeneous

Barigozzi

Tedeschi

2016

SSRN Journal

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Both borrowers and lenders can be socially responsible (SR). Ethical banks commit to …nanc-ing only ethical projects, which have social pro…tability but lower expected revenues than standard projects. Instead, no credible commitment exists for SR borrowers.The matching between SR borrowers and ethical banks reduces the frictions caused by moral hazard. However, when the type of the borrowers is not observable, then standard borrowers have incentives to invest in ethical projects pretending to be SR. We show that the separation of borrowers entails costs that are paid by SR entrepreneurs but are relatively low because standard lenders o¤er an outside option that relaxes the self-selection constraint of the borrowers.Technically, we solve a Contract Proposal Game where informed principals (borrowers) o¤er di¤er-ent menus of contracts to heterogeneous agents (banks). We show that market segmentation improves e¢ ciency and solves the problem of multiplicity of equilibria in Contract Proposal Games.Jel classi…cation: D86, G21, G30.

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Credit Rationing and Credit View: Empirical Evidence from an Ethical Bank in Italy

Cited by 44 publications

References 25 publications

The Role of Banks in the Transmission of Monetary Policy

The Role of Banks in the Transmission of Monetary Policy

Soft Information and Default Prediction in Cooperative and Social Banks

Informed Principals in the Credit Market When Borrowers and Lenders are Heterogeneous

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