Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion

Sher, Itai

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.008

Cited by 39 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 9 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…listener commits and announces an acceptance rule) and that all optimal persuasion rules are ex-post optimal. In [12], it is shown that concavity is the critical assumption for both aforementioned results: The listener's utility function is a concave transformation of the speaker's utility function. The model in [12] is broaden beyond binary listener' decisions given the concavity assumption.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…In [12], it is shown that concavity is the critical assumption for both aforementioned results: The listener's utility function is a concave transformation of the speaker's utility function. The model in [12] is broaden beyond binary listener' decisions given the concavity assumption. Assessing Web credibility somewhat resembles a persuasion game in the sense that the content producer (i.e.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…A game of persuasion is studied in [10,12]. In this game, a speaker attempts to persuade a listener to take an action by presenting evidence.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The proposed model is more specialized, as compared to previous work [10,12], and in our view better-suited for studying the strategies of rational stakeholders involved in the production and the credibility assessment of Web content. Our game-theoretic model fulfills the following requirements:…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Game-theoretic models of web credibility

Papaioannou

Aberer

Abramczuk

et al. 2012

Proceedings of the 2nd Joint WICOW/AIRWeb Workshop on Web Quality

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Research on Web credibility assessment can significantly benefit from new models that are better suited for evaluation and study of adversary strategies. Currently employed models lack several important aspects, such as the explicit modeling of Web content properties (e.g. presentation quality), the user economic incentives and assessment capabilities. In this paper, we introduce a new, game-theoretic model of credibility, referred to as the Credibility Game. We perform equilibrium and stability analysis of a simple variant of the game and then study it as a signaling game against naïve and expert information consumers. By a generic economic model of the player payoffs, we study, via simulation experiments, more complex variants of the Credibility Game and demonstrate the effect of consumer expertise and of the signal for credibility evaluation on the evolutionary stable strategies of the information producers and consumers.

show abstract

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…A game of persuasion is studied in [10,12]. In this game, a speaker attempts to persuade a listener to take an action by presenting evidence.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Game-theoretic models of web credibility

Papaioannou

Aberer

Abramczuk

et al. 2012

Proceedings of the 2nd Joint WICOW/AIRWeb Workshop on Web Quality

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…It thus influences the regulator's beliefs, but the regulator anticipates the bank's objectives. The paper is hence related to the theoretical literature on games of persuasion (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1986;Shin, 1994;Glazer and Rubinstein, 2001Turkay, 2011;Sher, 2010). Our paper introduces the sophistication of players and the complexity of arguments into these games.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulatory Capture by Sophistication

Hakenes

Schnabel

2014

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractOne explanation for the poor performance of regulation in the recent financial crisis is that regulators had been captured by the financial sector. We present a micro-founded model with rational agents in which banks may capture regulators due to their high degree of sophistication. Banks can search for arguments of differing complexity against regulation. Finding such arguments is more difficult for a bad bank, which the regulator wants to regulate more strictly. However, the more sophisticated a bank is, the more easily it can produce an argument that a regulator may not understand. Career concerns prevent the regulator from admitting this, hence he rubber-stamps even bad banks, which leads to inefficiently low levels of regulation. Bank sophistication leads to capture, and thus to worse regulatory decisions.

show abstract

Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games

Jiang

2023

Int J Game Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Evidence games study situations where a sender persuades a receiver by selectively disclosing hard evidence about an unknown state of the world. Evidence games often have multiple equilibria. Hart et al. (Am Econ Rev 107:690-713, 2017) propose to focus on truth-leaning equilibria, i.e., perfect Bayesian equilibria where the sender discloses truthfully when indifferent, and the receiver takes off-path disclosure at face value. They show that a truth-leaning equilibrium is an equilibrium of a perturbed game where the sender has an infinitesimal reward for truth-telling. We show that, when the receiver’s action space is finite, truth-leaning equilibrium may fail to exist, and it is not equivalent to equilibrium of the perturbed game. To restore existence, we introduce a disturbed game with a small uncertainty about the receiver’s payoff. A purifiable truthful equilibrium is the limit of a sequence of truth-leaning equilibria in the disturbed games as the disturbances converge to zero. It exists and features a simple characterization. A truth-leaning equilibrium that is also purifiable truthful is an equilibrium of the perturbed game. Moreover, purifiable truthful equilibria are receiver optimal and give the receiver the same payoff as the optimal deterministic mechanism.

show abstract

Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion

Cited by 39 publications

References 9 publications

Game-theoretic models of web credibility

Game-theoretic models of web credibility

Regulatory Capture by Sophistication

Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About