Credence and Correctness: In Defense of Credal Reductivism

Lee, Matthew Brandon

doi:10.1080/05568641.2017.1364142

Cited by 11 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Because my main opponent in this paper is credence-firsters, who agree with me that credences are essential for reasoning, I will focus on the crucial role of belief in reasoning. Dualists have proposed several roles that belief may play, including the ability to take a stand/have a view of the world (Foley 1993;Kalpan 1996) being indispensable for our practices of praise and blame (Buchak 2014), and allowing our attitudes to be correct or incorrect (Carter, Jaris and Rubin 2016;Lee 2017a;Ross and Schroeder 2014: 275-7).…”

Section: Iii2 Motivations For Dualismmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment

Jackson

2019

The Philosophical Quarterly

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Belief-credence dualism is the view that we have both beliefs and credences and neither attitude is reducible to the other. Pragmatic encroachment is the view that stakes alone can affect the epistemic rationality of states like knowledge or justified belief. In this paper, I argue that dualism offers a unique explanation of pragmatic encroachment cases. First, I explain pragmatic encroachment and what motivates it. Then, I explain dualism and outline a particular argument for dualism. Finally, I show how dualism can explain the intuitions that underlie pragmatic encroachment. My basic proposal is that in high-stake cases, it is not that one cannot rationally believe that p; instead, one ought not to rely on one's belief that p. One should rather rely on one's credence in p. I conclude that we need not commit ourselves to pragmatic encroachment in order to explain the intuitiveness of the cases that motivate it.

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Section: Iii2 Motivations For Dualismmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment

Jackson

2019

The Philosophical Quarterly

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“… 9 I further develop this view of the relationship between doubt and confidence in Lee 2016 a and Lee 2016 b . …”

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confidence: 82%

On the Arbitrariness Objection to the Threshold View

Lee

2017

Dialogue

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Proponents of the ‘Threshold View’ have held that to believe a proposition is to be sufficiently confident of the proposition’s truth, but that there is no sharp cutoff between degrees of confidence that constitute belief and degrees of confidence that do not. Brian Weatherson has objected that no plausible account of vagueness can support this view. In this paper, I reply to Weatherson’s objection. Along the way, I identify a way in which one might hope to maintain the Threshold View without a fuzzy threshold, and I reformulate the Threshold View to accommodate fuzzy thresholds without begging substantive questions about vagueness.

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“…A second challenge, pushed by Frankish (2009), notes that children and animals seem to have credences, but they do not appear to have the concept of probability, and thus cannot have probability‐beliefs (see also Eriksson & Hájek, 2007, pp. 206–207; Lee, 2017a). Moon and Jackson (Forthcoming) suggest that the creatures in question either have the relevant probabilistic concept, or do not have credences.…”

Section: Belief and Credence: Descriptive Questionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A further issue concerns whether, even if context‐dependent, the threshold must always be above 0.5. Authors who suggest the threshold is plausibly above 0.5 include Foley (1993, p. 144), Hunter (1996, p. 87), Chandler (2010, p. 669), Pettigrew (2015a, p. 13), Worsnip (2015, p. 552), Lee (2017a, pp. 273–4).…”

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confidence: 99%

The relationship between belief and credence

Jackson

2020

Philosophy Compass

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Sometimes epistemologists theorize about belief, a tripartite attitude on which one can believe, withhold belief, or disbelieve a proposition. In other cases, epistemologists theorize about credence, a fine‐grained attitude that represents one's subjective probability or confidence level toward a proposition. How do these two attitudes relate to each other? This article explores the relationship between belief and credence in two categories: descriptive and normative. It then explains the broader significance of the belief‐credence connection and concludes with general lessons from the debate thus far. Video Abstract link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3eOSlPVYxI8&feature=youtu.be

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Credence and Correctness: In Defense of Credal Reductivism

Cited by 11 publications

References 27 publications

How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment

How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment

On the Arbitrariness Objection to the Threshold View

The relationship between belief and credence

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