Crafting consensus

Zápal, Jan

doi:10.1007/s11127-017-0470-8

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

References 73 publications

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“…The mechanism exploited by the vote buyer in our model relies on pivotality and is not present in the literature on vote‐buying with expressive preferences, e.g., in Zápal (2017), members' responses to a bribe are uncertain, but pivotal considerations are absent because members do not take into account the effect of their vote on the outcome. Groseclose and Snyder (1996), Banks (2000), Dekel, Jackson, and Wolinsky (2008), Morgan and Várdy (2011), and Iaryczower and Oliveros (2017) also assume expressive preferences and introduce a second vote buyer.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences

Louis-Sidois,

Musolff

2024

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We analyze a vote‐buying model where the members of a committee vote on a proposal important to a vote buyer. Each member incurs a privately‐drawn disutility if the proposal passes. We characterize the cheapest combination of bribes that guarantees the proposal passes in all equilibria. When members vote simultaneously, the number of bribes is at least 50% larger than the number of votes required to pass the proposal (vote threshold). The number of bribes increases with the dispersion of the disutility distribution and all members are bribed with sufficient dispersion. A proportional increase in the number of members and the vote threshold leads to a less‐than‐proportional increase in capture cost, and the cost may increase with the vote threshold. With sequential voting and disutility distribution U[0,1], all members are bribed and bribes are equal. Finally, sequential voting increases capture cost in small committees and decreases it in large committees.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences

Louis-Sidois,

Musolff

2024

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Crafting consensus

Cited by 1 publication

References 73 publications

Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences

Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences

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