Covert and Side Channels Due to Processor Architecture

Wang, Zhenghong; Lee, Ruby

doi:10.1109/acsac.2006.20

Cited by 197 publications

(148 citation statements)

References 19 publications

(26 reference statements)

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“…This latter channel (the logon detection channel), has the advantage that it does not depend on the hardware cache and is also effective in the absence of accurate clocks. Thus countermeasures aimed at removing accurate clocks [3] or the hardware cache mechanism for side channels [10,17] will not effect this channel. A limitation of the logon detection channel is that it does not give information about which password characters are in which positions; thus a follow-up guessing attack will require more time.…”

Section: Our Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As mentioned above, the logon detection channel cannot be defeated by eliminating the hardware cache mechanism [10,17]. Also, removing accurate clocks [3,4] is unlikely to close this channel either.…”

Section: Countermeasuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The papers [12,11] also demonstrate cryptographic side channels against RSA, where [2,9] demonstrate side channels against AES. Countermeasures against cache based channels are presented in [10,17].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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New Side Channels Targeted at Passwords

Tannous

Trostle

Hassan

et al. 2008

2008 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC)

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Side channels are typically viewed as attacks that leak cryptographic keys during cryptographic algorithm processing, by observation of system side effects. In this paper, we present new side channels that leak password information during X Windows keyboard processing of password input. Keylogging is one approach for stealing passwords, but current keylogging techniques require special hardware or privileged processes. However, we have found that the unprivileged operation of modifying the user key mappings for X Windows clients enables a side channel sufficient for unprivileged processes to steal that user's passwords, even enabling the attacker to gain root access via sudo. We successfully tested one version on Linux 2.6; we were able to obtain a high degree of control over the scheduler, and thus we can obtain accurate timing information. A second version (logon detection) works without depending on accurate clocks or cache effects. Thus, in addition to demonstrating new side channels, we show that (a) side channels cannot be eliminated by removing accurate clocks or hardware cache mechanisms (b) side channels are of continued concern for computer security as well as cryptographic processing.

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Section: Our Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Countermeasuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

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New Side Channels Targeted at Passwords

Tannous

Trostle

Hassan

et al. 2008

2008 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC)

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show abstract

“…Side-channel attacks are based on observation of non-functional properties of a circuit, including execution time [8], power consumption [9], cache response times [10] or electromagnetic emissions [11]. For example, consider a circuit that stores and processes a 64-bit secret key 1 .…”

Section: Side-channel Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Hardware security and test: Friends or enemies?

Polian

2014

It - Information Technology

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Abstract:Hardware security is a relatively new scientific discipline which focuses on adversarial threats to hardware components of complex systems and infrastructures, including manipulation, unauthorized access to confidential data, and intellectual property theft. State-of-the-art test methods can contribute to detection and elimination of security threats but also may introduce new vulnerabilities. This article will explain this dichotomy and outline current research challenges.

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“…The capacity of covert timing channels has been increasing with the development of high-performance computers and high-speed networks. While covert timing channels studied in the 1970s could transfer only a few bits per second [2], covert timing channels in modern computers can transfer several megabits per second [3]. To defend against covert timing channels, researchers have proposed various methods to detect and disrupt them.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Model-Based Covert Timing Channels: Automated Modeling and Evasion

Gianvecchio

Wang

Wijesekera

et al.

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

105

133

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Abstract. The exploration of advanced covert timing channel design is important to understand and defend against covert timing channels. In this paper, we introduce a new class of covert timing channels, called model-based covert timing channels, which exploit the statistical properties of legitimate network traffic to evade detection in an effective manner. We design and implement an automated framework for building model-based covert timing channels. Our framework consists of four main components: filter, analyzer, encoder, and transmitter. The filter characterizes the features of legitimate network traffic, and the analyzer fits the observed traffic behavior to a model. Then, the encoder and transmitter use the model to generate covert traffic and blend with legitimate network traffic. The framework is lightweight, and the overhead induced by model fitting is negligible. To validate the effectiveness of the proposed framework, we conduct a series of experiments in LAN and WAN environments. The experimental results show that model-based covert timing channels provide a significant increase in detection resistance with only a minor loss in capacity.

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Covert and Side Channels Due to Processor Architecture

Abstract: Abstract

Cited by 197 publications

References 19 publications

New Side Channels Targeted at Passwords

New Side Channels Targeted at Passwords

Hardware security and test: Friends or enemies?

Model-Based Covert Timing Channels: Automated Modeling and Evasion

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