CoVE

Sahita, Ravi; Shanbhogue, Vedvyas; Bresticker, Andrew; Khare, Atul; Patra, Atish; Ortiz, Samuel O.; Reid, Dylan A.; Rajnesh, Kanwal,

doi:10.1145/3587135.3592168

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 4 publications

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“…While MPC, HE, and ZKPs have existed for decades and are based on well-defined mathematical concepts, CC is a relatively emerging technology. In addition to the existing TEEs -such as Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [7] and AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization-Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) [8] -new TEEs, such as Arm Confidential Compute Architecture (CCA) [9], [10], Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) [11], RISC-V Confidential Virtual Machine Extensions (CoVE) [12], [13], and IBM Protected Execution Facility (PEF) [14], are being introduced. Each of these TEEs has a distinctive attestation architecture and design (Table 1).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Formal Specification and Verification of Architecturally-Defined Attestation Mechanisms in Arm CCA and Intel TDX

Sardar,

Fossati,

Frost

et al. 2024

IEEE Access

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Formal Specification and Verification of Architecturally-Defined Attestation Mechanisms in Arm CCA and Intel TDX

Sardar,

Fossati,

Frost

et al. 2024

IEEE Access

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DeTA: Minimizing Data Leaks in Federated Learning via Decentralized and Trustworthy Aggregation

Cheng,

Eykholt,

et al. 2024

Proceedings of the Nineteenth European Conference on Computer Systems

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Intel TDX Demystified: A Top-Down Approach

Cheng,

Ozga,

Valdez

et al. 2024

ACM Comput. Surv.

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Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) is an architectural extension in the 4th Generation Intel Xeon Scalable Processor that supports confidential computing. TDX allows the deployment of virtual machines in the Secure-Arbitration Mode (SEAM) with encrypted CPU state and memory, integrity protection, and remote attestation. TDX aims to enforce hardware-assisted isolation for virtual machines and minimize the attack surface exposed to host platforms, which are considered to be untrustworthy or adversarial in the confidential computing’s new threat model. TDX can be leveraged by regulated industries or sensitive data holders to outsource their computations and data with end-to-end protection in public cloud infrastructures. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of TDX to potential adopters, domain experts, and security researchers looking to leverage the technology for their own purposes. We adopt a top-down approach, starting with high-level security principles and moving to low-level technical details of TDX. Our analysis is based on publicly available documentation and source code, offering insights from security researchers outside of Intel.

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CoVE

Cited by 3 publications

References 4 publications

Formal Specification and Verification of Architecturally-Defined Attestation Mechanisms in Arm CCA and Intel TDX

Formal Specification and Verification of Architecturally-Defined Attestation Mechanisms in Arm CCA and Intel TDX

DeTA: Minimizing Data Leaks in Federated Learning via Decentralized and Trustworthy Aggregation

Intel TDX Demystified: A Top-Down Approach

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