Coupling citizens and elites in deliberative systems: The role of institutional design

Abstract

A significant shortcoming in contemporary deliberative systems is that citizens are disconnected from various elite sites of public deliberation. This article explores the concept of ‘coupling’ as a means to better link citizens and elites in deliberative systems. The notion of ‘designed coupling’ is developed to describe institutional mechanisms for linking otherwise disconnected deliberative sites. To consider whether it is possible and indeed desirable to use institutional design to couple different sites in a deliberative system, the article draws on insights from a case study in which a mini‐public was formally integrated into a legislative committee. The empirical study finds that it is not only feasible to couple mini‐publics to legislative committees, but when combined, the democratic and deliberative capacity of both institutions can be strengthened. To be effective, ‘designed coupling’ requires more than establishing institutional connections; it also requires that actors to step outside their comfort zone to build new relationships and engage in new communicative spaces with different sets of ideas, actors and rules. This can be facilitated by institutional design, but it also requires leaders and champions who are well‐placed to encourage actors to think differently.

Scapegoats, silver bullets, and other pitfalls in the path to sustainability

“…First, the power disconnect, which occurs whenever those who experience environmental harm are politically marginalized. This is similar to the fractured politics of transition depicted by Hendriks (2016) but includes minority and disenfranchised groups as well as the public. Second, cycles of rationalization widen power disconnects by allowing decision makers to take credit for positive policy outcomes while blaming others for negative impacts.…”

“…Injunctions to narrow disconnects by including those who are most affected in decision-making processes are numerous (Reed 2008;Berkes 2003;Hendriks 2016;Jhagroe and Loorbach 2015;Klein et al 2011). Warnings to avoid silver bullets and panaceas abound as well (Young 2001;Ostrom 2007;Liu et al 2007).…”

“…construction of a levee that protects a wealthy district while diverting floodwater closer to a poor community). This depiction of politics is somewhat different from the literature on sustainability transitions, which tends to focus on general representation/deliberation (Hendriks 2016;Ercan and Hendriks 2013) or on preventing consolidation of power by local elites (Voß and Bornemann 2011). Moreover, this perspective highlights the role of the dynamic incentives associated with environmental impacts as well as more static incentive structures such as economic advancement or a quest for political power.…”

“…While stakeholder engagement is a major tool in the TM kit, it has been widely criticized for omitting politics both in theory (Meadowcroft 2011) and in practice (Avelino 2009;Hendriks 2009). A number of authors have worked to bridge this gap, either through institutional design (Hendriks 2016), inclusion of interest group politics (Frantzeskaki, Loorbach, and Meadowcroft 2012), embedding policy making in transition management (Voß 2014), or focusing on a "post-foundational" notion of democracy that goes beyond the voting public to consider representation of stakeholders as minority interest groups that might otherwise be ignored (Jhagroe and Loorbach 2015). Approaches that bring politics into transition management include cycles of signals and response with political ramifications, though the focus largely remains on bureaucratic response to calls for better energy efficiency, and so they do not really capture the full scope of the governance treadmill, or the effects of pitfalls like power disconnects or cycles of rationalization.…”

What can deliberative mini‐publics contribute to democratic systems?

“…Viewed through the lens of a problem‐based approach to democratic systems, the case illustrates common policy‐specific democratic deficits in inclusion, deliberation and actionable decision making, and serves to test whether a well‐organised deliberative mini‐public can respond. The Vancouver case is also ‘revelatory’ (Yin ; see also Hendriks ) in the sense that this appears to be the first time municipal planners, with the support of elected officials, have deliberately used a deliberative mini‐public to address democratic deficits rather than to fulfill (say) public engagement mandates, organise constituencies, or the many other reasons that mini‐publics might be organised.…”