County Government Choices for Redistributive Services

Abstract

This article seeks to examine factors that influence county government preferences for redistributive policies. An analysis of county services in 2007 reveals that political economic and political institutional influences stimulate redistributive service choices. Not only do these influences promote the provision of redistribution, but they also carry important implications for choices to internalize versus outsource production efforts. State-level influences and the reformed government structure consistently stimulate both the provision and internal production of redistributive services. Moreover, the findings suggest that the politics of redistribution as commonly understood for cities has different implications when applied to the environments of counties.

The politics of redistribution in local governments: the effect of gender representation on welfare spending in California counties

“…Third, consistent with prior studies, county expenditures in redistributive policy areas were determined primarily by intergovernmental revenue from the federal and state governments (Park 1996;Bahl et al 2002;Farmer 2011). Although our study could not ascertain the differential effect of state and federal financial support, estimates suggest that a one-dollar increase in intergovernmental revenue leads to an increase of about 20 cents in county spending on public assistance.…”

“…County choices for redistributive services may depend on community characteristics, such as population size and growth (Schneider and Park 1989;Park 1996;Choi et al 2010;Farmer 2011), problem intensity (Fosset and Thompson 2005) and racial diversity (Fosset and Thompson 2005;Choi et al 2010;Farmer 2011). We expect that there is a greater need for redistributive services in counties with a higher percentage of minority groups that may benefit from welfare programmes.…”

“…Witco and Newmark 2009). Redistributive services, such as welfare, health and public safety, are traditionally provided by counties as political subdivisions of state governments (Schneider and Park 1989;Berman 1993;Choi et al 2010;Farmer 2011). Most of these redistributive services are mandated and take up a large share of county spending (Schneider and Park 1989;Park 1996).…”

“…On one hand, counties with home rule have an incentive to focus more on services that match local needs. Average taxpayers in counties may choose to expand redistributive policies for social responsibility and long-term positive policy outcomes (Moane and Wallerstein 2001;Farmer 2011). 12 In this case, charter status may be positively associated with welfare expenditures.…”

“…12 In this case, charter status may be positively associated with welfare expenditures. However, counties are also tempted to focus on generating revenue with economic development rather than social welfare (Peterson 1981;Benton 2002b;Choi et al 2010;Farmer 2011). According to Peterson (1981), localities have distinct preferences for developmental policy areas rather than redistributive programmes, because they are afraid of losing residents and sources of revenue (Bahl et al 2002;Stein 2003;Farmer 2011).…”