Countermeasures against Power Analysis Attacks for the NTRU Public Key Cryptosystem

Lee, Mun-Kyu; Song, Jeong Eun; Choi, Dooho; Han, Dong‐Guk

doi:10.1587/transfun.e93.a.153

Cited by 27 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Atici et al [ABF + 08] proposed more compact encryptiononly and encryption/decryption NTRU implementations for RFID tags and sensor networks. Finally, Monteverde [Mon08] implemented NTRU on two microcontrollers from AVR MEGA family, and Lee et al [LSCH10] provided the result of NTRU implementation on Tmote Sky hardware, which is widely used in practical wireless sensor networks.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Constrained Implementation of Lattice-Based Cryptographic Primitives and Schemes on Smart Cards

Boorghany

Sarmadi

Jalili

2015

ACM Trans. Embed. Comput. Syst.

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Abstract. Most lattice-based cryptographic schemes with a security proof suffer from large key sizes and heavy computations. This is also true for the simpler case of authentication protocols which are used on smart cards, as a very-constrained computing environment. Recent progress on ideal lattices has significantly improved the efficiency, and made it possible to implement practical lattice-based cryptography on constrained devices. However, to the best of our knowledge, no previous attempts were made to implement lattice-based schemes on smart cards. In this paper, we provide the results of our implementation of several state-of-the-art lattice-based authentication protocols on smart cards and a microcontroller widely used in smart cards. Our results show that only a few of the proposed lattice-based authentication protocols can be implemented using limited resources of such constrained devices, however, cutting-edge ones are suitably efficient to be used practically on smart cards. Moreover, we have implemented fast Fourier transform (FFT) and discrete Gaussian sampling with different typical parameter sets, as well as versatile lattice-based public-key encryptions. These results have noticeable points which help to design or optimize lattice-based schemes for constrained devices.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Constrained Implementation of Lattice-Based Cryptographic Primitives and Schemes on Smart Cards

Boorghany

Sarmadi

Jalili

2015

ACM Trans. Embed. Comput. Syst.

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“…Atici et al presented the first power analysis attacks on NTRU in [3], targeting implementations on RFIDs. This was followed by Lee et al [23], who considered first and second-order DPA attacks on NTRU. The attacks were based on the leakage of Hamming distance information, generated during the computation of the convolution product.…”

Section: Power Analysis Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [46], Wang et al considered the countermeasure proposals of [23] and suggested that blinding during the computation of the convolution products was not sufficient. A DPA was described to exploit the calculation of intermediate values.…”

Section: Power Analysis Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Physical Protection of Lattice-Based Cryptography

Khalid

Oder

Valencia

et al. 2018

Proceedings of the 2018 on Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI

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The impending realization of scalable quantum computers will have a significant impact on today's security infrastructure. With the advent of powerful quantum computers public key cryptographic schemes will become vulnerable to Shor's quantum algorithm, undermining the security current communications systems. Post-quantum (or quantum-resistant) cryptography is an active research area, endeavoring to develop novel and quantum resistant public key cryptography. Amongst the various classes of quantum-resistant cryptography schemes, lattice-based cryptography is emerging as one of the most viable options. Its efficient implementation on software and on commodity hardware has already been shown to compete and even excel the performance of current classical security public-key schemes. This work discusses the next step in terms of their practical deployment, i.e., addressing the physical security of lattice-based cryptographic implementations. We survey the state-of-the-art in terms of side channel attacks (SCA), both invasive and passive attacks, and proposed countermeasures. Although the weaknesses exposed have led to countermeasures for these schemes, the cost, practicality and effectiveness of these on multiple implementation platforms, however, remains under-studied.

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“…Even though the cryptographic algorithm is theoretically safe, the private key or secret message can be exposed by the side-channel leakage when executing the algorithm. In this regard, there are previous studies on SCA on NTRU by Lee et al [7] and Zheng et al [8]. They performed DPA on NTRU and revealed the secret key.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Single Trace Side Channel Analysis on NTRU Implementation

Kim

Jin

et al. 2018

Applied Sciences

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As researches on the quantum computer have progressed immensely, interests in post-quantum cryptography have greatly increased. NTRU is one of the well-known algorithms due to its practical key sizes and fast performance along with the resistance against the quantum adversary. Although NTRU has withstood various algebraic attacks, its side-channel resistance must also be considered for secure implementation. In this paper, we proposed the first single trace attack on NTRU. Previous side-channel attacks on NTRU used numerous power traces, which increase the attack complexity and limit the target algorithm. There are two versions of NTRU implementation published in succession. We demonstrated our attack on both implementations using a single power consumption trace obtained in the decryption phase. Furthermore, we propose a countermeasure to prevent the proposed attacks. Our countermeasure does not degrade in terms of performance.

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Countermeasures against Power Analysis Attacks for the NTRU Public Key Cryptosystem

Cited by 27 publications

References 32 publications

On Constrained Implementation of Lattice-Based Cryptographic Primitives and Schemes on Smart Cards

On Constrained Implementation of Lattice-Based Cryptographic Primitives and Schemes on Smart Cards

Physical Protection of Lattice-Based Cryptography

Single Trace Side Channel Analysis on NTRU Implementation

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