Countermeasure against blinding attacks on low-noise detectors with a background-noise-cancellation scheme

Lee, Min Soo; Park, Byung Kwon; Woo, Min Ki; Park, Chang Hoon; Kim, Yong‐Su; Han, Sang-Wook; Moon, Sung

doi:10.1103/physreva.94.062321

Cited by 14 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…Regarding our second, one-way key distribution protocol, Bob's action is similar to the one in the standard protocols: he measures in one of the two publicly known bases. To counter such an attack, Bob can apply one of the known counter-measures proposed and analysed in [85,86,87,88,89]. Nevertheless, we would like to note again that our QW protocol is more complex than the standard ones based on few (typically four) quantum states, and thus its implementations might possibly invoke new challenges, a topic worth a separate study.…”

Section: Practical Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantum key distribution with quantum walks

Vlachou

Krawec

Mateus

et al. 2018

Quantum Inf Process

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Quantum key distribution is one of the most fundamental cryptographic protocols. Quantum walks are important primitives for computing. In this paper we take advantage of the properties of quantum walks to design new secure quantum key distribution schemes. In particular, we introduce a secure quantum key-distribution protocol equipped with verification procedures against full man-in-the-middle attacks. Furthermore, we present a one-way protocol and prove its security. Finally, we propose a semi-quantum variation and prove its robustness against eavesdropping.

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Section: Practical Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantum key distribution with quantum walks

Vlachou

Krawec

Mateus

et al. 2018

Quantum Inf Process

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“…We can simulate the relationship of the QBERs with 0 dB (e atk 0(opp) ) and 3 dB (e atk 3(opp) ), we set tR 0 = 0.75 for Eq. (37), because e atk 0(opp) and e atk 3(opp) are increasing with decreasing tR 0 . Similarly, if Eq.…”

Section: Appendix B: Calculation Process If One Relationship Is Satis...mentioning

confidence: 95%

“…( 35) and ( 36), we have 0 ≤ tR 0 ≤ 0.75. (37) When both VA-SPDs in the same basis have the same attenuation value, then e atk 0(s) , e atk 3(s) can be converted into…”

Section: Appendix B: Calculation Process If One Relationship Is Satis...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The most effective one is measurement-device-independent scheme [32,33], but it requires a Bell-state measurement of two independent remote laser sources, which is experimentally challenging. The other methods are mainly focusing on the technical improvements in SPDs [34][35][36][37] or measurement devices [38][39][40][41], or passively monitoring parameters [42][43][44][45][46][47][48]. However, these countermeasures may not be provably secure because the characteristics of actual devices and implementations are not under con-sideration in the security proofs [43,49].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Robust countermeasure against detector control attack in a practical quantum key distribution system

Qian¹,

He²,

Wang³

et al. 2019

Optica

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In real-life implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD), the physical systems with unwanted imperfections would be exploited by an eavesdropper. Based on imperfections in the detectors, detector control attacks have been successfully launched on several QKD systems, and attracted widespread concerns. Here, we propose a robust countermeasure against these attacks just by introducing a variable attenuator in front of the detector. This countermeasure is not only effective against the attacks with blinding light, but also robust against the attacks without blinding light which are more concealed and threatening. Different from previous technical improvements, the single photon detector in our countermeasure model is treated as a blackbox, and the eavesdropper can be detected by statistics of the detection and error rates of the QKD system. Besides theoretical proof, the countermeasure is also supported by an experimental demonstration. Our countermeasure is general in sense that it is independent of the technical details of the detector, and can be easily applied to the existing QKD systems.

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“…Other proposals like using intensity modulation, random variation of the detector efficiencies or advanced receiver configurations [57][58][59][60] could also be adapted for their use in the counterfactual QKD protocol. In any case, these proposals should be evaluated with care to avoid slightly modified attacks that circumvent them, as it has happened in the past [61,62].…”

Section: Analysis Countermeasures and Future Workmentioning

confidence: 99%