Counterfactuals of Freedom and the Luck Objection to Libertarianism

Hartman, Robert J.

doi:10.5840/jpr2017426102

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2021

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“…Specifically, anti-Molinists argue that true CCFs do not exist because there is nothing to ground such truths (Adams 1977;Hasker 1989: 29-52;Cowan 2003), 3 or because they are ruled out by Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals (van Inwagen 1997). 4 Anti-Molinists have also argued that true CCFs are incompatible with libertarian freedom (Hasker 1986). 5 True CCFs are perceived to be a threat not only to free creatures, but also to certain features that God is supposed have.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Counterfactuals of divine freedom

Cohen

2015

Int J Philos Relig

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Contrary to the commonly held position of Luis de Molina, Thomas Flint and others, I argue that counterfactuals of divine freedom (CDFs) are pre-volitional for God within the Molinist framework. That is, CDFs are not true even partly in virtue of some act of God's will. As a result, I argue that the Molinist God fails to satisfy an epistemic openness requirement for rational deliberation, and thus she cannot rationally deliberate about which world to actualize.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%