Counterfactual attitudes and multi-centered worlds

Abstract

Counterfactual attitudes like imagining, dreaming, and wishing create a problem for the standard formal semantic theory of de re attitude ascriptions. I show how the problem can be avoided if we represent an agent's attitudinal possibilities using multi-centered worlds, possible worlds with multiple distinguished individuals, each of which represents an individual with whom the agent is acquainted. I then present a compositional semantics for de re ascriptions according to which singular terms are assignmentsensitive expressions and attitude verbs are assignment shifters.

Binding bound variables in epistemic contexts

“…Ninan (2012) closely resembles the counterpart semantics described in the previous section, though it has additional bells and whistles.…”

“…I make no claim to novelty in detail-my contributions here involve summary, emphasis, and gestures toward new horizons. Central to my discussion is the idea that certain modals ought to be understood as "assignment-shifting" devices: Various theorists have been toying with assignmentshifting treatments of epistemic contexts such as attitude verbs and epistemic modals (e.g., Cumming 2008, Santorio 2012, Ninan 2012, Pickel 2015, Rieppel 2017). On such views an epistemic " " ends up binding the x in Fx.…”

Names, Masks, and Double Vision

“…In general, given a conceptual transform f (g), the relativization of f (g) to w, written f (g) w , is defined as follows: 16. See Ninan (2012) and Santorio (2012) for similar moves. The proposed entry for 'believes' can consequently be thought of as a quantifier over world-assignment pairs similar to Cumming's (2008) ' ': for any belief world w, the assignment it is paired with is f (g) w .…”

“…Various details will have to be sorted out, but let me illustrate the intuitive 14. The semantics I shall go on to articulate in certain respects resembles proposals made by Yalcin (2015), Ninan (2012), Santorio (2012), as well as Cumming's (2008) own proposal, insofar as 'believes' will shift not just the world but also the variable assignment. Other directions one could pursue include the dynamic semantics proposed by Maier (2009) or a view that postulates "concept generator" variables in the syntax, as proposed by Percus and Sauerland (2003) and Charlow and Sharvit (2014). idea.…”

Counterfactual de se

“…(Based on Ninan 2008Ninan , 2012 Suppose that there is only one way in which Ralph is acquainted with Ortcutt: he sees him at the beach. It seems that we can conceive of perfectly sensible situations that have this property in which the sentence is true.…”