2012
DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2011.635676
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Could Integrity Be An Epistemic Virtue?

Abstract: This paper makes a preliminary case for a central and radical claim. I begin with Bernard Williams' seldom-faced argument that integrity cannot be a moral virtue because it lacks two key ingredients of moral virtues, namely a characteristic thought and motivation. Whereas, for example, generosity involves the thought that another could use assistance, and the motivation to actually give assistance, integrity lacks these two things essential to morally excellent responses. I show that several maneuvers aimed at… Show more

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Cited by 22 publications
(18 citation statements)
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“…Part IV covers the development of a generalized social systemic formalism of the good, goodness vis-à-vis integrity as attribute in it. Part V gives a simple worked out example in game theory to show how the social concept of integrity can be measured as value affecting the social entirety 370 K 44,3 within the meaning attached to goodness as an epistemic precept (Scherkoske, 2012). Other applications of the trait of integrity are pointed out.…”
Section: Objectivementioning
confidence: 98%
“…Part IV covers the development of a generalized social systemic formalism of the good, goodness vis-à-vis integrity as attribute in it. Part V gives a simple worked out example in game theory to show how the social concept of integrity can be measured as value affecting the social entirety 370 K 44,3 within the meaning attached to goodness as an epistemic precept (Scherkoske, 2012). Other applications of the trait of integrity are pointed out.…”
Section: Objectivementioning
confidence: 98%
“…Others within the community may not approve of a person's principles or commitments but we could "recognize them as ones a reasonable person might take to be of great importance" (McFall, 1987, p. 11). The determination of the significance of the extent of the worth or goodness of a value or principle is not only subjective at the individual level but incorporates the notion that integrity relates to the social world at this level too (Calhoun, 1995;McLeod, 2004;Scherkoske, 2012). McLeod (p. 227) extends this nicely by stating that "people stand for things for others, not only for themselves .…”
mentioning
confidence: 96%
“…Calhoun (1995) includes self-knowledge, courage, honesty, humility, civility, respect, and self-respect among these resources. Her focus on "fellow deliberators" (p. 260) alerts us to an elaboration of virtue as epistemic (Glannon, 1995;McLeod, 2004;Scherkoske, 2010Scherkoske, , 2012 as well as social. From an epistemic perspective, integrity "involves both having the appropriate regard for our [own] judgment, and a commitment to getting things right" (Scherkoske, 2010, p. 356).…”
mentioning
confidence: 97%
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