Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey

Abstract

'Democratic conditionality' is the core strategy of the EU to induce candidate states to comply with its human rights and democracy standards. How does it work and when is it effective? This article reports findings of a comparative study of 'hard cases': Slovakia under Meciar; Turkey; and Latvia. We argue that EU democratic conditionality is a strategy of 'reinforcement by reward' which works through intergovernmental material bargaining. Its efficacy depends on the candidate governments' domestic political costs of compliance. By contrast, social influence and transnational mobilization have proved ineffective. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003.

Europeanisation in new member and candidate states

“…Some studies therefore explicitly contrast the relative effectiveness of conditionality and alternative strategies (see e.g. Kelley 2004;Kubicek 2003b;Schimmelfennig et al 2003;Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005b). To the extent that these alternative strategies -conditionality and 'learning' -also draw on explanatory factors favoured by different theoretical approaches (as the following section elaborates), these then lead to a distinction between alternative (but not necessarily mutually exclusive) mechanisms of Europeanisation.…”

“…Such studies distinguish between two different channels -intergovernmental and societal -and analyse their relative importance for the EU's domestic impact (Schimmelfennig et al 2003;Vachudová 2005). Through the intergovernmental channel, the EU directly influences governments and policy-makers in candidate countries.…”

The Politics of Privatization and Europeanization in Europe's Periphery: Slovenian Banks and Breweries for Sale?

“…This outcome is attributed to the asymmetrical nature of negotiations, where the EU could set the terms and CEE applicant states, willing to do anything to join, complied in full (Grabbe 2003). Other scholars suggest that the kind of organized domestic resistance to EU pressures observed in West European states was virtually absent in East European states due to their unconsolidated party systems, decimated trade unions and weak civil societies (Schimmelfennig et al 2003;Howard 2002). In sum, the dominant view of EU influence is that it reinforced democratizing and liberalizing processes already underway in CEE states, or set recalcitrant 'illiberal' regimes on a solid political and economic reform path (Vachudova 2005, Kelly 2004.…”

O processo de institucionalização da condicionalidade política na União Européia e sua eficácia como um instrumento de promoção da democracia

“…Perspectivas neo-institucionalistas referem-se aos interesses racionais dos atores envolvidos (neo-institucionalismo racional), a fatores históricos e contextos institucionais (neo-institucionalismo histórico) e às estruturas ideacionais e identidade dos atores (neo-institucionalismo sociológico). (PEVENHOUSE, 2002;SCHIMMELFENNIG et al, 2003). Outros analistas defendem que o processo de institucionalização da condicionalidade política no âm-bito internacional só foi possível após o fim da Guerra Fria e a priorização da promoção da democracia sobre a estabilidade pelas grandes potências, especialmente os Estados Unidos (PEVENHOUSE, 2002).…”