2017
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.06.025
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Costly voting, turnout, and candidate valence

Abstract: We build a model of voluntary and costly expressive voting, where the relative weight of ideology and valence issues over voting costs determines how people vote and if they actually turn out to vote. In line with the conventional rational calculus approach, the model predicts that the cost of voting depresses voter turnout. Against the conventional wisdom, though, high voting cost/low turnout elections tend to have a larger share of voters for whom the common value signal on candidates' valence matches their … Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(3 citation statements)
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References 6 publications
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“…Finally, within a theoretical framework where voting yields expressive benefits that are driven both by a position issue (ideology) and by a common value (valence of candidates), holding the elections in circumstances that represent temporary boosts to a community's social capital can tilt the selection mechanism in favor of the most valent candidates (Lo Prete and Revelli, 2017). The idea (formalized in Appendix B) is that voters receive signals before the election about the valence of candidates, and those signals may or may not match their ideological views.…”
Section: Timing Of Elections Social Capital and The Selection Of Canmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Finally, within a theoretical framework where voting yields expressive benefits that are driven both by a position issue (ideology) and by a common value (valence of candidates), holding the elections in circumstances that represent temporary boosts to a community's social capital can tilt the selection mechanism in favor of the most valent candidates (Lo Prete and Revelli, 2017). The idea (formalized in Appendix B) is that voters receive signals before the election about the valence of candidates, and those signals may or may not match their ideological views.…”
Section: Timing Of Elections Social Capital and The Selection Of Canmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indeed, professional records can provide useful information being a proxy of the level of knowledge required to perform specific tasks such as leading and managing public activities. Following the existing literature (Bordignon et al 2013;Revelli, 2016;Lo Prete and Revelli, 2017), we use the profession of the mayor before entering politics as a proxy for her administrative skills. More specifically, we build a dummy variable (High professional status) taking the value 1 in case the elected mayor was employed in a distinguished profession (architects, engineers, physicians, accountants, lawyers and academics).…”
Section: Valencementioning
confidence: 99%
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