Cost-Benefit Tradeoff of Byzantine Attack in Cooperative Spectrum Sensing

Wu, Jun; Yu, Yue; Zhu, Hancheng; Song, Tiecheng; Hu, Jing

doi:10.1109/jsyst.2019.2952395

Cited by 21 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…Taking advantage of the rich audit data set, the authors in [109] present two anomaly detection scheme for detecting the malicious nodes. The first scheme exploits the frequency property of such statistical data and develops a lightweight intrusion detection scheme.…”

Section: Mechanism Of Ssdf Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

A survey on security issues in cognitive radio based cooperative sensing

et al. 2021

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Cognitive radio based cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) is severely affected when some secondary users maliciously attack it. Two attacks regarded as key adversaries to the success of CSS are spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) and primary user emulation attack (PUEA). Defending SSDF and PUEAs has received significant attention in research in the past decade globally. This paper performs a state-of-the-art comprehensive survey of the researches on defending SSDF and PUEAs. First, the preliminaries like Hypothesis testing for detecting the primary user and different models of CSS are discussed briefly. Then a categorization of the defence mechanisms for defending both the attacks has been proposed as active and passive. Active mechanisms are suitable for an immediate defence in a limited time span, while passive mechanisms are suitable for flexible CSS systems that are ready to detect the attacks over a period of time and suppress them permanently by bringing changes in their underlying operations. An in-depth tutorial on both the defence mechanisms is provided from the perspectives of the secondary users throughput and the interference to the primary user. Finally, a detailed survey on the open research problems in this area and some possible solutions has been performed. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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Section: Mechanism Of Ssdf Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

A survey on security issues in cognitive radio based cooperative sensing

et al. 2021

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“…From the above three types of Byzantine attack, it can be seen that they are basically static attacks. From the perspective of MUs, although this kind of always attack has a great negative impact on CSS (it also requires a large attack cost 42 ), but only takes effect in some traditional data fusion technologies, that is, decision rule (including Or, And, Majority rule). For other data fusion technologies with Byzantine defense algorithms, always attack can be easily identified and eliminated.…”

Section: Probabilistic Hard Byzantine Attack Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robust and efficient cooperative spectrum sensing against probabilistic hard Byzantine attack

Chen

Gan

et al. 2021

Trans Emerging Tel Tech

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Cognitive radio (CR) is regarded as a powerful technology to solve the problem of spectrum shortage and underutilization. As a key function of CR technology, cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) allows secondary users (SUs) to detect the primary user (PU)'s signal so that they identify and opportunistically access the available spectrum. However, the openness of CSS paradigm makes cognitive radio networks (CRNs) suffer from Byzantine attack, thereby undermining the premise of CR framework. To this aim, we formulate a probabilistic hard Byzantine attack model, in which malicious users (MUs) can conduct various attack strategies, and make an in‐depth investigation on the blind scenario. On the one hand, in order to ensure the robustness of CSS, a method to evaluate the reliability of the secondary user (SU)'s sensing result based on the channel status detection is proposed and an innovative weight coefficient is considered to selectively utilize the sensing information from MUs. On the other hand, we design a sequential fusion method based on reputation value (RV) and differential mechanism, with the aim of improving the efficiency of CSS. According to above methods and mechanism, the weighted differential sequential symbol (WDS2) algorithm is designed, which integrates the weight evaluation into sequential method to make the global decision for CSS. Finally, compared to the existing various data fusion algorithms, simulation results show that the proposed WDS2 not only defends against various Byzantine attacks to secure the robustness of CSS, but also requires less samples in support of an accurate global decision to improve the efficiency of CSS.

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“…In consideration of their own attack risks, MUs do not always adopt such extreme attack strategies because extreme attack strategies will soon fail to deploy due to low reputation in common reputation-based methods. From a long-term perspective, the intermittent or interval attack strategies will not be discovered immediately, the MU has a certain degree of concealment and remains in CRNs for a long time [28]. In this regard, we start with a probabilistic attack strategy to develop a generalized and flexible Byzantine attack model.…”

Section: Byzantine Attack Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Throughput and Interference for Cooperative Spectrum Sensing: A Malicious Perspective

2021

KSII TIIS

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Cognitive radio (CR) is a feasible intelligent technology and can be used as an effective solution to spectrum scarcity and underutilization. As the key function of CR, cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) is able to effectively prevent the harmful interference with primary users (PUs) and identify the available spectrum resources by exploiting the spatial diversity of multiple secondary users (SUs). However, the open nature of the cognitive radio networks (CRNs) framework makes CSS face many security threats, such as, the malicious user (MU) launches Byzantine attack to undermine CRNs. For this aim, we make an in-depth analysis of the motive and purpose from the MU's perspective in the interweave CR system, aiming to provide the future guideline for defense strategies. First, we formulate a dynamic Byzantine attack model by analyzing Byzantine behaviors in the process of CSS. On the basis of this, we further make an investigation on the condition of making the fusion center (FC) blind when the fusion rule is unknown for the MU. Moreover, the throughput and interference to the primary network are taken into consideration to evaluate the impact of Byzantine attack on the interweave CR system, and then analyze the optimal strategy of Byzantine attack when the fusion rule is known. Finally, theoretical proofs and simulation results verify the correctness and effectiveness of analyses about the impact of Byzantine attack strategy on the throughput and interference.

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Cost-Benefit Tradeoff of Byzantine Attack in Cooperative Spectrum Sensing

Cited by 21 publications

References 30 publications

A survey on security issues in cognitive radio based cooperative sensing

A survey on security issues in cognitive radio based cooperative sensing

Robust and efficient cooperative spectrum sensing against probabilistic hard Byzantine attack

Throughput and Interference for Cooperative Spectrum Sensing: A Malicious Perspective

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