Cosmopolitan recognition: three vignettes

Abstract

This paper examines recognition in the cosmopolitan sphere of recognition – a sphere of ethical life and social freedom formed in the processes of recognition between individuals and groups across, over, and beyond, the state. The paper contends that Axel Honneth’s recognition theory can overcome many of the limitations inherent to established cosmopolitan paradigms, and, through normative reconstruction, provide a unique methodological framework from which existing cosmopolitan social relations can be examined. This will provide the foundations for arelationalcosmopolitanism. The paper argues that only a form of mutual recognition that satisfies both local and cosmopolitan ties of political community could adequately secure the intersubjective conditions necessitated in the Hegelian, ontological notion of freedom (freedom as ‘being at home with oneself in one’s other’). This contention is pursued through three interrelated arguments: (i) an engagement with Honneth’s analysis of the intersubjective conditions necessary for leading a ‘good’ or ‘successful’ life through mutual recognition; (ii) deploying the method of normative reconstruction to identify social freedoms in the cosmopolitan sphere, and; (iii) by exploring the existence of cosmopolitan recognition as a unique form of personal relations, an extension of rights in transnational civil society, and, as a unique form of solidarity in an emergent cosmopolitan public sphere.

Recognition, multiplicity and the elusive international

“…Engaging in critical readings of Brincat's (2017) cosmopolitan approach to recognition and political approaches to recognition in the work of Epstein et al (2018), as well as the influential critique of recognition developed by Markell (2003), I show how this tension is immanent to recognition theory as it has developed in IR. I suggest that while an agonistic framing of the pathologies of sovereignty provides valuable insights into relations between states, it fails to address the diverse empirical and normative practices which are emphasised by critical and international political theory.…”

“…Given the differences between international theory and the domestic focus of much social philosophy, the now-considerable scholarship on recognition in IR has grown from key analytical distinctions between the two, including the role of recognition in IR’s traditional focus on the relations between states (Agné et al, 2013; Daase et al, 2015; Lindemann and Ringmar, 2012), the potential of recognition ‘above’ or ‘beyond’ the states-system (Brincat, 2017; Hayden and Schick, 2016), and whether recognition can be reconstructed to reflect the role of misrecognition in international affairs (Epstein et al, 2018). The conceptual range opened by these debates has meant that IR scholars sometimes consider patterns of social integration or the normative transformation of social order as grounded in overlapping but distinct concepts that all fall semantically within the single term ‘recognition’ (Bartelson, 2013).…”

“…By identifying a foundational link between recognition and the development of subjectivity, Honneth’s work establishes its priority as a historically-instantiated but universal presupposition of social struggles based in gendered, racialised or class distinctions. This normative priority is cemented by placing emphasis on the functional role that recognition plays for processes of social reproduction (Brincat, 2017: 11), in turn providing a critical standard by which social structures can be evaluated. Haacke (2005: 193), among others in IR, has argued that the value of Honneth’s scheme arises from its ability to analytically differentiate between different experiences of disrespect, considerably broadening the concept’s critical and theoretical range.…”

Critical International Relations Theory

“…As we have already seen, Habermas initially sought emancipation through dialogical community and yet would later retreat into the liberal state, with all its inequalities. More recently Honneth has turned to the intersubjective ontology of recognition theory to ground emancipation in concrete, historical conditions -something only recently being taken up in IR relating to questions of cosmopolitan political community (Brincat, 2017). By contrast, what constitutes emancipation in CIRT is a notoriously difficult question to pin down.…”

What is the responsibility to respect human rights? Reconsidering the ‘respect, protect, and fulfill’ framework

“…11 Honneth (1995) updates this tradition through an elaborate account of how the recognition of others' humanity includes not only attention to others' physical integrity ('care'), but also the need to ensure that no one is structurally excluded from rights in a society (as in slavery) ('respect'note that this is different from this paper's usage of the term), and to ensure that different 'ways of life' are not arbitrarily denigrated ('esteem'). See also Phillips (2015, 44-45), Weinert (2015), Hayden and Schick (2016), Brincat (2017).…”