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One of the reasons for which corruption is so difficult to eradicate is because the actors involved are skilled in adapting their behaviour to changing institutional landscapes. However, surprisingly little is known about how corruption displacement functions across multiple levels of government. Using novel multilevel data on a political scandal in Italy and a Difference-in-Differences estimation strategy, I provide within-country evidence that a sudden increase in accountability for national deputies can impact negatively upon the behaviour of local-level public officials and politicians. In treated districts, where there is an increase in the indictment rate of national deputies, local-level corruption increases significantly as compared to nontreated districts. My results show how, in contexts characterised by systemic corruption, changes intended to enhance accountability can trigger a series of mechanisms within the political machine that exploit different levels of government.
One of the reasons for which corruption is so difficult to eradicate is because the actors involved are skilled in adapting their behaviour to changing institutional landscapes. However, surprisingly little is known about how corruption displacement functions across multiple levels of government. Using novel multilevel data on a political scandal in Italy and a Difference-in-Differences estimation strategy, I provide within-country evidence that a sudden increase in accountability for national deputies can impact negatively upon the behaviour of local-level public officials and politicians. In treated districts, where there is an increase in the indictment rate of national deputies, local-level corruption increases significantly as compared to nontreated districts. My results show how, in contexts characterised by systemic corruption, changes intended to enhance accountability can trigger a series of mechanisms within the political machine that exploit different levels of government.
Artykuł koncentruje się na funkcjonowaniu włoskich organizacji przestępczych w aspekcie politologicznym, których cechą charakterystyczną jest zdobywanie i sprawowanie pozaprawnej władzy nad określonym terytorium, jako warunku wstępnego do osiągania zysków ekonomicznych w wymiarze lokalnym, krajowym i ogólnoeuropejskim. Uzyskując szeroko pojęte wpływy na danym obszarze, mafie – niczym aktorzy polityczni o charakterze niepaństwowym – prowadzą jego eksploatację, wykorzystując swój kapitał społeczny w obrębie mechanizmów gospodarki wolnorynkowej. Aktualnie istotą fenomenu włoskiej przestępczości zorganizowanej jest powstawanie związków między sferą przestępczą a światem polityki, gospodarki oraz instytucji publicznych, czego rezultatem staje się przekształcenie zwykłej działalności kryminalnej w kolejnego, niepaństwowego gracza politycznego, operującego na wielu płaszczyznach na zasadzie procesów ekspansji terytorialnej.
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