Corruption in Latin America: Understanding the Perception-Exposure Gap

Abstract

What beliefs do citizens who perceive levels of corruption in their countries to be of significance hold? Do those beliefs arise from their exposure to corruption? Furthermore, do perceptual and experiential corruption decrease the reservoir of legitimacy of a democratic regime? We attempt to answer these questions using the 2012 Americas Barometer survey of 24 Latin American countries. We find that whereas "rational-choice corruptors," males and, to a lesser extent, individuals with resources are particularly exposed to corruption, perceived corruption originates from a sense of impunity derived from a negative evaluation of the state's ability to curb corruption. In addition, we show that perceived corruption significantly decreases citizen satisfaction with democracy, but exposure to corruption does not. All in all, the policy implications of our study are straightforward: having an efficient and trusted judiciary is central to curbing both experiential and perceived corruption, even if it increases the latter in the short run.

Who Sees Corruption? The Bases of Mass Perceptions of Political Corruption in Latin America

“…Extant research highlights multiple forces driving heterogeneity of perceptions of corruption, including socio-economic and partisan bias factors (Bohn, 2012;Manzetti and Rosas, 2015;Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga, 2013), political trust (Bohn, 2012; Morris and Klesner, 2010), and system-level perceptions of corruption (Canache and Allison, 2005). We contribute to this literature in the third part of our framework, where we posit that variation in corruption perceptions may be at least partly systematic, with origins in predictable psychological foundations.…”

“…Within countries where corruption is severe, citizens may become disgruntled; declining levels of trust and legitimacy can result, potentially undermining political stability (e.g. Anderson and Tverdova, 2003;Bohn, 2012;Canache and Allison, 2005;Rose-Ackerman, 1999;Seligson, 2002Seligson, , 2006Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga, 2010; c.f. Manzetti and Wilson, 2007).…”

Macroeconomic determinants of sovereign bond market development in African emerging economies

“…Macroeconomic determinants of sovereign bond fragile socio-economic and political environments have imperfect information about politicians, which may lead to misguided decisions as voters act on false information (Bohn, 2013). This is likely to translate into a widening of the fiscal deficit in the periods immediately prior to an election in most of the African countries in the sample.…”

Firm-level trust in emerging markets: the moderating effect on the institutional strength- corruption relationship in Mexico and Peru

“…Indeed, this does not mean that high firm-level trust begets employees with false expectations about corruption outside the firm: these employees are not unaware. They know their public institutions are weak, and that corruption exists (Bohn, 2013). By building employees' particularized trust in the firm, managers do not lull them into believing that the firm is immune or insulated from corruption.…”

“…Firms operating in developed and emerging markets face the reality of corruption (Misangyi, Weaver, & Elms, 2008;Ionescu, 2013). Corruption occurs in all countries, but it presents special challenges to firms in emerging market countries (Transparency International, 2016;Bohn, 2013). Complicating the issue is corruption's influence that weakens already weak public institutions (Morris, 2009).…”