Corruption et mobilisation des recettes publiques : une analyse économétrique

Abstract

CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2007.16 2 Résumé: L'objet de cet article est d'analyser l'effet de la corruption sur la mobilisation des recettes publiques.Une analyse économétrique sur données de panel (125 pays et couvrant la période 1980-2002) permet de ne pas rejeter l'hypothèse d'un effet négatif de la corruption sur les recettes publiques. Cet effet négatif de la corruption n'affecte pas de manière identique les différentes composantes des recettes. En raison probablement des opportunités différentes de rente, la corruption modifie la structure du prélèvement public au profit des recettes tarifaires assises sur le commerce international et au détriment des impôts directs et indirects, dont en particulier la TVA. Il apparaît également qu'un canal de transmission important de la corruption sur le prélèvement public est celui transitant par un affaiblissement du civisme fiscal capté à travers des variables de l'action publique. Abstract:In this paper, we analyze the relationship between corruption and public revenues. An empirical investigation of panel data (125 countries and covering the period 1980-2002) makes it possible not to reject the hypothesis that corruption has a negative effect on public revenues collection. However, the impact is different on the various components of revenue. This is because different rent opportunities are created by corruption which seems to modify public revenues structure in favour of customs tariffs revenues while reducing direct and indirect taxes such as VAT. It also appears that a major channel of corruption is the weakening of the tax morality which in this study is captured by various public service delivery variables.

Corruption, Taxes and Compliance

“…Similarly, the impact of corruption on taxation of goods and services (such as VAT and excise) is found to be statistically significant (Attila et al, 2008, Thornton, 2008, and Imam and Jacobs, 2014. Estimates for direct taxes are mixed: both personal and corporate income taxes are found to be insignificantly impacted by corruption in Attila et al (2008) and Thornton (2008), and only Imam and Jacobs (2014) find a negative impact on corporate taxes in the Middle East. Though these papers attempt to solve the endogeneity issue (see the empirical section), they remain focused on regions where tax collection has historically been weaker.…”

“…High taxation could encourage tax evasion and low tax capacity could favor corrupt behavior. To address this endogeneity issue, the literature has applied different instrumental variable approaches (Ghura 2002, Hwang 2002, Attila et al 2008, and Thornton 2008. In its IV-GLS procedure, Ghura (2002) uses the contemporaneous, squared, and lagged values of population, population growth, and the urbanization rate as instruments.…”

“…In Hwang (2002), corruption is instrumented with three variables: the percent of population professing protestant faith, a dummy for a former British colony, and an index of ethnolinguistic fragmentation. Attila et al (2008) favors ethnolinguistic fragmentation, legal origins (French and British), distance from the equator, and the urbanization rate as instruments. Thornton (2008) uses openness, the black-market exchange rate premium, ethnic fragmentation, and a dummy for oil producers instead.…”

“…However, due to data limitations, few empirical studies have considered the effect of corruption on different tax types. These studies suggest that indirect taxes requiring frequent interactions between tax authorities and individuals are more prone to corruption (Hwang 2002, Attila et al 2008, Thornton 2008, Imam and Jacobs 2014. For example, taxes on international trade, which are an important source of revenue for developing countries, are negatively and statistically significantly affected by corruption.…”

Corruption and tax compliance: evidence from small retailers in Bamako, Mali

“…In addition to cross-country studies using perception indicators of corruption or tax morale (e.g. , Torgler 2005;Richardson 2009;Attila et al 2009;Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas 2010), econometric studies at the firm level are scarce. Alm et al 2016; and Gauthier and Goyette (2014) obtained the negative impact of corruption on tax compliance using extensive firm surveys of the World Bank.…”