Corruption dynamics model

Malafeyev, Oleg; Nemnyugin, S. A.; Rylow, Denis; Kolpak, Eugeny P.; Awasthi, Achal

doi:10.1063/1.4992358

Cited by 21 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…The equilibrium states that allow to specify the dominant form of corruption and investigate its stability, depending on the parameters of the psychological mimicry and the rigor of anti-corruption laws are found. In [172] the corruption dynamics is analyzed by means of the lattice model similar to the three-dimensional Ising model: agents placed at the nodes of the corrupt network periodically choose to perform or not to perform the act of corruption. In [173] the transportation problem of multi-agent interaction between different goods' transporters with a corruption component is introduced and studied.…”

Section: Chapter 5 Appendix: Notes and Complimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-agent interaction and nonlinear Markov games

Kolokoltsov¹,

Malafeyev²

2019

Preprint

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Section: Chapter 5 Appendix: Notes and Complimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-agent interaction and nonlinear Markov games

Kolokoltsov¹,

Malafeyev²

2019

Preprint

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“…Caulkins et al, in 2013 developed a corruption model to determine the level of corruption in the bureaucracy by taking into account the state variables of honest employees and corrupt employees [2]. Malafeyev et al, made a formulation of corruption dynamics using lattice model which is similar to the three-dimensional Ising model [3]. In 2018, the SCJH model that describe the transmission process of corruption was proposed by Obsu et al, [4].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Optimal Control Problem of SECR Corruption Dynamic Model

Sovia Prabaningtyas,

Subchan Subchan,

Irma Fitria

2024

ARASET

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In this paper, the SECR model of corruption dynamics was proposed and will be analyzed, including non-negativity and boundedness of the model, corruption cases-free equilibrium point, and local stability. In order to reduce the number of corruption cases, the SECR model is extended with two controls strategies, i.e, u1 : preventive campaign for corruption by the KPK institution, and u2 : giving punishment for corrupted individual. Furthermore, it is investigated how control strategies should be applied to prevent corruption cases optimally. The model will be simulated in three scenarios, i.e. with full control u1 and u2 simultaneously, only u1 control, and only u2 control. Then, each of these simulations results will be compared with the results of the simulation model without control. The optimal control problem will be solved using Pontryagin’s Minimum Principle and Runge Kutta order 4th method for numerical simulation with Matlab. The simulation results show that the first scenario give the optimal solution in reducing the number of exposed and corrupted subpopulations with minimum controls effort and short time period. Based on these results, it can be concluded that in order to prevent and reduce the number of corruption cases, the control strategy giving punishment for the corrupted individuals must be also followed by prevention campaign corruption in society by the KPK, where both these control strategies must be carried out together to give the optimal results.

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