2010
DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-5348
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Corruption And Productivity : Firm-Level Evidence From The BEEPS Survey

Abstract: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz … Show more

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Cited by 86 publications
(78 citation statements)
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“…De Rosa et al (2010) find that corruption has a negative effect on firm productivity in Central and Eastern European countries. Hillman and Krausz (2004) show that corruption brings short term performance advantages.…”
Section: Theoretical Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…De Rosa et al (2010) find that corruption has a negative effect on firm productivity in Central and Eastern European countries. Hillman and Krausz (2004) show that corruption brings short term performance advantages.…”
Section: Theoretical Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hence, EMEs operating in host countries with well-developed IPR laws can reduce the probability of imitation and protect their innovation output. Finally, corruption depresses investment in R&D because it increases uncertainty, transaction costs and the risk of expropriation (De Rosa, Gooroochurn & Görg, 2010). Therefore, in host countries with stronger institutional development, EMEs can capitalize on institutional advantages to develop stronger technological capabilities (Makino, Lau & Yeh, 2002;Wu, 2013).…”
Section: Host Country Institutional Development and Emes' Innovation mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Méon and Weill (2010), for example, find evidence that corruption is an efficient grease in the economy for countries with less effective institutions, whereas Méon and Sekkat (2005) find the opposite result that corruption is detrimental under the same conditions. Focusing specifically on CEE countries, De Rosa, Gooroochurn and Görg (2010) show that bribery does not emerge as a second-best option to achieve higher firm productivity in order to circumvent institutional deficiencies. We too therefore attempt to test the "grease-the-wheel" hypothesis empirically.…”
Section: The Detailed Empirical Specificationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…6 We therefore measure the "intensity" of bribery at the country-sector level rather than simply the "participation" in bribery, which is what De Rosa, Gooroochurn and Görg (2010) instead capture by taking binary 1/0 variables on the basis of these questions. 7 Fungacova, Kochanova and Weill (2015) and Hanousek and Kochanova (2015) define the BEEPS questions on bribery we employ in this paper as the most neutral and less subject to perception bias.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%