Corruption and military spending

Gupta, Sanjeev; Mello, Luiz de; Sharan, Raju

doi:10.1016/s0176-2680(01)00054-4

Cited by 335 publications

(225 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…As previously mentioned, this result is affected by the high levels of trade barriers that are able to favour local firms and activities and may yield a greater propensity to corrupt bureaucrats. In line with the findings of Gupta et al (2001), more competition among prevalent local firms, that also share similar norms and rules, incites them to pay commissions to enhance their profitability.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 61%

Corruption and the effects of economic freedom

Pieroni

d’Agostino

2013

European Journal of Political Economy

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The predictions that economic freedom is beneficial in reducing corruption have not been found to be universally robust in empirical studies. The present work reviews this relationship by using firms' data in a cross-country survey and argues that approaches using aggregated macro data have not been able to explain it appropriately. We model cross-country variations of the microfounded economic freedom-corruption relationship using multilevel models. Additionally, we analyze this relationship by disentangling the determinants for several components of economic freedom because not all areas affect corruption equally. The results show that the extent of the macro-effects on the measures of (micro)economic freedom for corruption, identified by the degree of economic development of a country, can explain why a lack of competition policies and government regulations may yield more corruption. Estimations for Africa and transition economy subsamples confirm our conjectures.JEL : H10; H11; H50; K20; O5

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 61%

Corruption and the effects of economic freedom

Pieroni

d’Agostino

2013

European Journal of Political Economy

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“…as well as its growth rate (Economic growth per capita), which are commonly used variables (Davoodi et al 2001;Goldsmith 2003;Gupta et al 2001). We log Gross National Income per capita to reduce skewness.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Disarming Fears of Diversity: Ethnic Heterogeneity and State Militarization, 1988—2002

Soysa

Neumayer

2008

Journal of Peace Research

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This study investigates whether ethnic and other forms of social diversity affect militarization of society. Recent scholarship in economics finds that high diversity leads to lower provision of public goods. At the same time, many conflict studies find that highly diverse societies face a lower risk of civil war, as opposed to relatively more homogenous populations. The authors explore whether diversity prompts governments to militarize heavily in order to prevent armed conflict, which would then crowd out spending on other public goods in a `guns versus butter' trade-off. Thus, `preventive militarization' would explain both outcomes. Yet the authors find the opposite: higher levels of ethnic diversity predict lower levels of militarization. If high diversity lowers the hazard of civil war, as many find, then it does not happen via preventive militarization. If diverse societies spend less on public goods, then this is not because they are crowded out by security spending. The results support those who suggest that diversity may, in fact, pose a lower security threat to states, since it is highly likely that states facing potential social strife would prioritize state militarization.

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“…The point of departure of this line of work is Shleifer and Vishny (1993) who argue that corrupt governments will tend to favor infrastructure and defense projects where corruption opportunities are abundant (compared to spending on say, education and health). The empirical evidence is largely supportive of this since corrupt countries tend to overinvest in public infraestructures which moreover are of lower quality (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997), spend more on defense (Gupta, de Mello and Sharan 2001) and less on education (Mauro 1997 and1998). More recently, Liu and Mikesell (2014) draw on evidence across U.S. states and report that corruption increases spending in public construction projects and reduces spending on education and health.…”

Section: Construction and Corruption: Existing Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Construction corrupts: empirical evidence from a panel of 42 countries

2015

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The construction sector, whether privately or publically financed, is characterized by potentially large rents and government intervention. Not surprisingly then, both casestudy and survey evidence has been provided highlighting the problem of corruption in this sector. In this article, we test the proposition that a bigger construction sector is likely to be inimical to clean government based on a panel of 42 countries over the period 1995 to 2011. We control for a range of potentially counfounding variables and the expectation that corrupt public officials may favor the development of this sector because it increases the volume of rents available to them. Our empirical evidence shows that a larger construction sector will tend to worsen perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. JEL Classification: D73, L74

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Corruption and military spending

Cited by 335 publications

References 29 publications

Corruption and the effects of economic freedom

Corruption and the effects of economic freedom

Disarming Fears of Diversity: Ethnic Heterogeneity and State Militarization, 1988—2002

Construction corrupts: empirical evidence from a panel of 42 countries

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