Corruption and Corporate Reputation: The Paradox of Buffering and Suffering

Gardberg, Naomi A.; Sampath, Vijay; Rahman, Noushi

doi:10.5465/ambpp.2012.206

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Corruption has been universally and largely conceived, especially in the Western context, as the "misuse of authority for personal, sub-unit or organizational gain" [1] recognizing mostly its negative and corrosive effect on organizations and their stakeholders [2]. Indeed, corruption represents a huge phenomenon with a negative impact in terms of damage for public sensibilities [3], disruption of trust in societal institutions [4], growth of extra economic costs [5], damage of reputation [6], and reduction of trust in esteemed industries [7]. Anyway, although there are such negative effects of corruption, many contributions in research have outlined that corruption is somehow considered to be "normal" in numerous organizations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corrupt behavior in public organizations: ethics, rationalization, and socialization for an integrated reading

Fierro,

Varriale,

Ferrara

2024

Corruption, Bribery, and Money Laundering - Global Issues

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Corruption has been receiving an increasing attention by scholars and practitioners, also due to the growth of corrupt behaviors in both private and public organizations worldwide. Focusing the attention on public context, discretion is an unavoidable element of administrative action, which derives from the incompleteness of contracts and the information asymmetries that characterize every agency relationship. A further element of uncertainty within agency relationship is represented by subjective elements of those who commit fraudulent behaviors (rationalization) and by contextual elements that push for socialization and, therefore, acceptance by the group of such behaviors, by going to inhibit group control able to prevent its commission. Thus, the main problem arises of monitoring possible degenerations in administrative behavior. For this purpose, a combination of institutional and organizational strategies and ethical strategies could be interesting and desirable. This conceptual study provides an innovative and integrated reading of the corruption phenomenon through the lens of agency theory (AT) and organizational behavior (OB) approaches, where codes of ethics and codes of conduct play a crucial role as tools for guiding and controlling the behavior of public officials. The codes define a system of moral and reputational incentives, in addition to criminal and administrative sanctions, aimed at increasing the ethical capital of administrations and managing “gray areas” that are not adequately regulated. This chapter aims to provide an integrated framework, combining AT and OB approaches, to discuss such strategies related to ethical and social issues.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corrupt behavior in public organizations: ethics, rationalization, and socialization for an integrated reading

Fierro,

Varriale,

Ferrara

2024

Corruption, Bribery, and Money Laundering - Global Issues

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“…The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing (Edmund Burke) There is almost universal agreement that corruption, defined within the Western context as the "misuse of authority for personal, sub-unit or organizational gain" (Ashforth & Anand, 2003, p. 2) has a corrosive effect on organizations and their stakeholders. Corruption offends public sensibilities (Palmer, 2013), erodes trust in societal institutions (Sutherland, 1949), imposes extra economic costs (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2016), damages reputations (Gardberg et al, 2012), and undermines trust in esteemed industries (Toffler & Reingold, 2004).…”

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confidence: 99%

How Corruption is Tolerated in the Greek Public Sector: Toward a Second-Order Theory of Normalization

et al. 2020

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Secrecy and “social cocooning” are critical mechanisms allowing the normalization of corruption within organizations. Less studied are processes of normalization that occur when corruption is an “open secret.” Drawing on an empirical study of Greek public-sector organizations, we suggest that a second-order normalization process ensues among non-corrupt onlookers both inside and beyond the organization. What is normalized at this level is not corruption, but its tolerance, which we disaggregate into agent-focused tolerance and structure-focused tolerance. Emphasizing the importance of non-corrupt bystanders, we claim that second-order normalization helps corruption persist in situations where its presence is openly acknowledged. This adds an important new dimension to normalization theory and we unpack its implications for both future research and practice in this area.

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Corporate Reputation’s Invisible Hand: Bribery, Rational Choice, and Market Penalties

2016

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Corruption and Corporate Reputation: The Paradox of Buffering and Suffering

Cited by 6 publications

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Corrupt behavior in public organizations: ethics, rationalization, and socialization for an integrated reading

Corrupt behavior in public organizations: ethics, rationalization, and socialization for an integrated reading

How Corruption is Tolerated in the Greek Public Sector: Toward a Second-Order Theory of Normalization

Corporate Reputation’s Invisible Hand: Bribery, Rational Choice, and Market Penalties

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