Corrupt Governmental Networks

Jancsics, Dávid; Jávor, István

doi:10.1080/10967494.2012.684019

Cited by 63 publications

(56 citation statements)

References 63 publications

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“…The regime at large operates using an unusual and informal network and a non-static combination of politicians and oligarchs. Public decision-makers and oligarchs extract public money from the system through intentionally designed and professionally managed channels (Jancsics-Jávor 2012). Under this system, corruption happens not primarily in the traditional form of graft, fraud or bribery, but through the endeavors of the elite to distort the political and economic system in its favor.…”

Section: Emergence Of Cronyismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Continuity or Disruption? Changing Elites and the Emergence of Cronyism after the Great Recession – the Case of Hungary

Martin¹

2017

CJSSP

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Section: Emergence Of Cronyismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Continuity or Disruption? Changing Elites and the Emergence of Cronyism after the Great Recession – the Case of Hungary

Martin¹

2017

CJSSP

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“…The absence of political criteria in recruitment shelters administrative decisions from political rent‐seeking and makes civil servants better able to withstand political pressure since their career is not on the line to the same extent and since they do not owe their appointments to political superiors. Note that, interestingly, simple technical capacity does not feature in most accounts (e.g., Dahlström et al ), perhaps because these skills are also useful to ‘formalize’ and ‘legalize’ corrupt deals (Janscisc and Jávor ).…”

Section: What We Know and What We Don'tmentioning

confidence: 99%

Civil service management and corruption: What we know and what we don't

Meyer‐Sahling

Mikkelsen

Schuster

2018

Public Administration

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Numerous studies have linked a range of economic, social, and institutional variables with corruption in government. Yet, most of this literature overlooks the management of public officials themselves. This is a relevant omission: almost all corrupt exchanges involve public officials. This article reviews studies—36 in total—that do address civil service management and anti‐corruption. It finds that prior works assess a narrow set of civil service management structures. Meritocratic recruitment and, less robustly, pay levels have been associated with lower corruption. By contrast, robust evidence on how corruption relates to other established public personnel management areas—such as distinct pay structures (rather than levels), promotion, transfer, and job stability practices—is largely unavailable. The article thus calls for research assessing the effects of a broader set of civil service management practices to gain a deeper understanding of corruption, and how to curb it.

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“…Ezek azok a projektekben jellemzők, amikor a kormányzati szereplő képes kényszeríteni a vállalkozókat, hogy fizessenek vissza a megnyert pályázati illetve projektpénzből. A negyedik típust a "monopolisztikus" hálózatok alkotják, amelyekben politikai és gazdasági elit a szabályozás manipulációján keresztül hoz létre belső kvázi-piacokat, ahol jelentős előnyöket élvez (Jancsics-Jávor 2012).…”

Section: Társadalmi Hálózatok éS Struktúrakutatásunclassified

Structures, inequalities and networks

Gerő¹,

Kovách²

2015

Socio.hu

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Sociologists define occupational and educational differences as a main source of inequalities. Based on this view, labour-market, distribution of income and wealth or institutions mediating their effects would be the main forces rendering the society. Rooted in this idea, sociological analysis tends to understood social structure as a grouping of individuals where groups are mostly defined by the individual's occupational characteristics.Although the explanatory power of these models is weakening this view keeps its strong position in research on social structure and social integration. Naturally it would be misleading to say that occupational approach is the only one to explore the social structure. But occupational and other approaches are common to neglect the role of institutions, groups and organizations in defining the social structure.We aim to review the weaknesses of recently favoured approaches and to offer an integrated one. First, this approach, instead of focusing on identifying groups found in a society, emphasize mechanisms rendering them. Second, we search for these mechanisms mainly on two levels: individual and organisational networks and the interplay between them. Third we suggest, that one of the most important mechanisms -not rejecting the role of the market -of social integration is redistribution.We distinguish among three forms of redistribution: welfare redistribution which aims to decrease inequalities through the school system or the social services. Project-based redistribution, which became a general mechanism in financing the public sector and development. Recombinant redistribution and aims the (re)distribution of capital and property by purely political means. The last type is in our special interest, since it is strong in the post-soviet region and especially in systems what Csillag and Szelényi call as neo-prebendal political systems.Redistribution, however in principle is working on the organizational level, in practice is a kind of social resource which allocation is tied to social networks. Thus, redistribution and social networks in a society must be highly interdependent.After discussing theoretical considerations of connections among redistribution and social networks, we show the main mechanisms, through which this interdependency can be examined empirically.

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Corrupt Governmental Networks

Cited by 63 publications

References 63 publications

Continuity or Disruption? Changing Elites and the Emergence of Cronyism after the Great Recession – the Case of Hungary

Continuity or Disruption? Changing Elites and the Emergence of Cronyism after the Great Recession – the Case of Hungary

Civil service management and corruption: What we know and what we don't

Structures, inequalities and networks

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