2013
DOI: 10.1162/isec_c_00119
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Correspondence: Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect

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Cited by 27 publications
(23 citation statements)
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“…Another major fault line is expressed by the fact that UN operational framework on Responsibility to Protect fails to address or restrain unilateral humanitarian intervention mostly undertaken by P5 member states. (Evans 2006: 41) The framework did not succeed in separating humanitarian necessities from strategic and geopolitical restrictions of UN permanent members of the Security Council. The inability of humanitarian intervention to meets its said objective cast doubt on the philosophical and legal framework of the policy To this far this paper ends up by underpinning that, it's apparently evident and no longer a question to investigate whether or not political ambitions are major pull factors for humanitarian intervention, rather the question now is how can this intersection be effectively manage to reflect a more humanize political ambition and an effective humanitarian action.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Another major fault line is expressed by the fact that UN operational framework on Responsibility to Protect fails to address or restrain unilateral humanitarian intervention mostly undertaken by P5 member states. (Evans 2006: 41) The framework did not succeed in separating humanitarian necessities from strategic and geopolitical restrictions of UN permanent members of the Security Council. The inability of humanitarian intervention to meets its said objective cast doubt on the philosophical and legal framework of the policy To this far this paper ends up by underpinning that, it's apparently evident and no longer a question to investigate whether or not political ambitions are major pull factors for humanitarian intervention, rather the question now is how can this intersection be effectively manage to reflect a more humanize political ambition and an effective humanitarian action.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(Teson 2001) It is argued that the pronouncement of the war on terror and U.S led military intervention in Iraq was a continuation and acceleration of the process to spread liberal values that gained wide recognition after the end of the cold world. (Evans, Thakur, & Pape, 2013;199) Indeed Michel Foucault's philosophy had earlier set the basis for liberal views on human rights protection to be enforced globally, he stated "Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone." (Foucault 1978) In the same line of thought the former British PM in 1991 claimed that war are being waged to protect values and not to protect territorial ambitions.…”
Section: The Rise Of Humanitarian Intervention As a Liberal Instrumenmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…70 However, this statement is problematic because as aforementioned the third pillar of the R2P incorporates more than just military intervention and alternative response measures should not be overlooked. 71 Furthermore,…”
Section: Secretary Williammentioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to Thakur (2013), R2P is victim-and people-centered; it puts the needs of the victims and potential victims ahead of the needs of the intervening states, whereas humanitarian intervention is deferential to the preferences and priorities of the intervening states. For Evans and Thakur (2013), the shift away from a right of humanitarian intervention to the responsibility to protect is exemplified by R2P's embrace of "a whole spectrum of preventive and reactive responses, with coercive military action reserved only for those extreme and exceptional cases" (p. 202). The shift in discourse is further buttressed by R2P's incorporation of its three core elements: (1) the responsibility to prevent; (2) the responsibility to react; and (3) the responsibility to rebuild.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%