Correlation Power Analysis Attack to Midori-64

Abstract

Recently, with the rapid advancement of technology, Internet of Things (IoT‏‏‏‏) security has become more efficient and more complex, especially for resource-limited devices such as embedded devices, wireless sensors and radio frequency identification tags (RFID). Lightweight block ciphers (LBCs) provide security for these technologies to protect them against adversaries, but the need for low power consumption in LBCs is one of the most important challenges for IoT‏ technologies. Furthermore, these LBCs are subject to multiple attacks and side channel attacks (SCAs) are among the mentioned threats to these cryptosystems. A type of SCA is correlation power analysis (CPA) in which the attacker tries to reach the key using the relationship between the power consumption of the chip during the algorithm running, data processing, and operations. In this article, a CPA attack is designed to discover master key of the Midori-64 block cipher. According to the proposed method, an attack is done to the first round S-boxes to get half of the key bits. Then, the second round S-boxes were attacked to other half of key bits just use 300 plain text samples. Finally, the most important physical attacks performed on the Midori, are compared to our proposed CPA attack.