Correlates of South Korean Public Opinion on Nuclear Proliferation

Abstract

What explains South Korean public opinion on nuclear weapons development? Despite the US security commitment, most South Koreans consistently support independent nuclear weapons development. To solve this puzzle, we investigate the mechanisms of security threat and security commitment under which individuals develop their opinion on nuclear proliferation. An original survey of 1,988 South Korean adults shows empirically supported correlates of South Korean public opinion on nuclear proliferation. Public support for proliferation is largely shaped by external security threats: nuclear threats from North Korea and China, but also the latent nuclear superiority of Japan. Public opposition to proliferation is fostered by the perceived credibility of the US security commitment, but not by its perceived effectiveness. The results provide insights into South Korean public opinion on nuclear proliferation and can inform the design of a nonproliferation policy tailored to South Korea.

Nonproliferation Information and Attitude Change: Evidence From South Korea

“…21. This finding is consistent with Son and Yim (2021). They found a connection between the credibility of the US security commitment and the public opposition to proliferation in South Korea.…”

“…Ko (2019) argues that neither forward nuclear deployment nor a conditional threat of military punishment reduces public support for nuclear weapons acquisition significantly more than a declaratory policy. Son and Yim (2021) found that security threats from nuclear weapons, as well as superior nuclear latency, increase public support for proliferation, while credible security commitment decreases support for proliferation among the South Korean public.…”

“…Security threats from North Korea were somewhat lessened in 2019 due to the US-DPRK and ROK-DPRK joint summits for denuclearization. For this reason, pro-armament respondents in the 2019 experiment may place a lower value on nuclear weapons development as a source of internal balancing against North Korea's nuclear threats (Son and Yim 2021). After 3 years' silence, North Korea resumed its nuclear activities near the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and tested its ballistic missiles from November 2021 to January 2022, during which our second experiment was conducted.…”

“…1 Recent studies, however, have increasingly focused on the role of public opinion in shaping elite decisions on nuclear security policy (Berger 2014; Cole 1997; Flynn and Rattinger 1985). In this shift to public opinion in nuclear proliferation research, an increasing number of scholars are focusing on South Korea for its potential contributions to both studying and deriving policy implications for nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation (Ko 2019; Sukin 2019; Son and Yim 2021).…”