Correlates of South Korean Public Opinion on Nuclear Proliferation

Son, Sangyong; Yim, Man‐Sung

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3866107

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

References 27 publications

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“…For example, the Japanese public has for decades remained strongly opposed to nuclear weapon use given the Hiroshima and Nagasaki legacies (Tanaka 1970;Baron, Gibbons, and Herzog 2020). In contrast, amid high tensions with Pyongyang, studies have shown the majority of South Koreans are interested in developing their own nuclear weapons even if they trust the nuclear umbrella (Ko 2019;Sukin 2020a;Son and Yim 2021). In the United States, reactions to Trump's criticism of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United Nations, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership revealed many Americans are skeptical of international obligations (Pew Research Center 2017).…”

Section: Extended Deterrence and Nuclear Crisesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Under the Umbrella: Nuclear Crises, Extended Deterrence, and Public Opinion

Allison

Herzog

2022

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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How robust is public support for extended nuclear deterrence in patron and client states? Recent studies have improved scholarly understanding of US public opinion about nuclear weapon use against non-nuclear adversaries. Yet, there is limited knowledge of public attitudes regarding retaliation for nuclear strikes against US allies. We develop a theoretical typology of nuclear crises and investigate this phenomenon with a novel survey experiment ( n = 6,623). Americans, Japanese, and South Koreans viewed realistic emergency alert messages about a most-likely case for nuclear retaliation: a North Korean missile attack on a US ally protected by the nuclear umbrella. Support for nuclear retaliation is low in all three countries, with important cross-national differences. Favorability increases with North Korean nuclear first-use, but it remains limited nonetheless. Surprisingly, US “tripwire” troop casualties do not increase Americans’ demands for nuclear retaliation. These findings have important implications for the study of nuclear crises and practice of extended deterrence.

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