Corporations in Court: Big Business Litigation in U. S. Federal Courts, 1971–1991

Abstract

This article provides an overview of federal litigation involving the largest 2,000 U. S. corporations over the period 1971–91. Reporting from a unique data set of the authors’construction, it finds that althugh the aggregate volume of business litigation grew during the 1970s and early 1980s, it has actually been declining in recent years in all major categories of cases; business‐related litigation is heavily concentrated, with an extremely limited number of business “mega‐litigants” accounting for most of the activity; this concentration is particularly evident in tort, with the result that the tort trend line outside the concentration is actually flat or declining; a good deal of the growth in litigation outside the tort area can be attributed to business itself; and big business wins overwhelmingly, as plaintiff and defendant, in cases that involve it. The general applicability of these findings is limited by the data's restriction to federal court litigation and the structure of the Integrated Federal Court Data Base from which the authors’data set was constructed. This granted, the report is by far the most comprehensive treatment of U. S. big business litigation to date, and its findings are strikingly at odds with the premises of much current policy discussion.

Interest Groups in the Israeli High Court of Justice: Measuring Success in Litigation and in Out‐of‐Court Settlements

“…Galanter's hypothesis as to the advantages of``repeat players'' in litigation has been corroborated by many studies in the U.S. (Wheeler et al 1987;Sheehan et al 1992;Dunworth & Rogers 1996) as well as in other countries such as England (Atkins 1991) and Canada (McCormick 1993). While these studies found that government agencies as well as other repeat players enjoyed high success rates in litigation, they did not address the issue of the mechanisms by which repeat players achieved higher success rates than other litigants.…”

Do the “Haves” Still Come Out Ahead? Resource Inequalities in Ideological Courts: The Case of the Israeli High Court of Justice

“…Accordingly, their decisions reflect the existing disparities in wealth and power in society, while the courts themselves are neutral (if not indifferent) to the inequalities entailed by their institutional passivity and ideological detachment (Galanter 1974:119-20).1 The theory has been corroborated by studies of the appellate courts in the United States Songer et al 1999) as well as of district courts (Dunworth & Rogers 1996) and, to a lesser degree, in states' supreme courts (Wheeler et al 1987;Farole 1999). Accordingly, their decisions reflect the existing disparities in wealth and power in society, while the courts themselves are neutral (if not indifferent) to the inequalities entailed by their institutional passivity and ideological detachment (Galanter 1974:119-20).1 The theory has been corroborated by studies of the appellate courts in the United States Songer et al 1999) as well as of district courts (Dunworth & Rogers 1996) and, to a lesser degree, in states' supreme courts (Wheeler et al 1987;Farole 1999).…”

Generative Mechanisms Transforming the Social Order

“…For example, issues of confl ict resolution in markets can be framed in terms of formal external control over organizational life (Hawkins 1984 ;Reiss 1984 ;Shapiro 1984 ;Vaughan 1983 ), but also in terms of more informal mechanisms such as reputation and ostracising (Macaulay 1963 ) or private arbitration (Dezalay and Garth 1996 ;Lemercier 2007 ). Both formal and informal processes help interdependent managers to monitor and sanction each other before resorting to well-defi ned but costly court procedures (Cheit and Gersen 2000 ;Dunworth and Rogers 1996 ;Macaulay 1963 ;Rooks et al 2000 ;Lazega 1994Lazega , 2001.…”